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UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ: REAFFIRMING
THE FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER AND
REMEMBERING FEDERALISM
The United States Constitution specifically enumerates the federal
government's power to regulate commerce "among the several states."1
While this grant of federal authority over commerce might appear rela-
tively unambiguous, considerable debate persists over the precise defini-
tion of the term "commerce." 2 The phrase "among the several states"
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that
Congress shall have the power "[tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id. This clause was adopted primarily in
response to the economic problems the new nation experienced under the Articles of Con-
federation. THOMAS H. CALVERT, REGULATION OF COMMERCE UNDER THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 3 (1907). The Articles of Confederation did not provide for centralized
control over commerce but instead provided: "The United States in Congress assembled
shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of ... regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States." UNITED STATES
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX (emphasis added).
As a result of this decentralized structure, individual states began imposing taxes on
goods from other states. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 307-08
(Max Farrand ed., 1966); CALVERT, supra, at 4. This lack of national control over com-
merce threatened the new nation's economic well-being. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.3, at 138 (5th ed. 1995); see NOAH WEBSTER, AN
EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787),
reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DUR-
ING ITS DISCUSSION By THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 61-62 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1968) (1888)
(recognizing the need for a unified central government). Noah Webster warned that
"[w]ithout powers lodged somewhere in a single body, fully competent . . to regulate
commerce ... our confederation is a cobweb-liable to be blown asunder by every blast of
faction that is raised in the remotest corner of the United States." Id.; see THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 42, at 267 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (recognizing that the Con-
federacy's "defect of power" was the absence of power to regulate commerce between the
states); THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 49 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (recom-
mending national control over commerce to strengthen the nation against foreign forces).
In response to this decentralization, the Founders granted the federal government power
over commerce "among the several states" to strengthen the nation's ability to confront
economic problems. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 139.
2. Compare United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1643 (1995) (suggesting that
commerce denotes "sale and/or transport rather than business generally") (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888) ("The buying and selling and the trans-
portation incidental thereto constitute commerce ....") with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1936) ("The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication .... ); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189
(1824) (defining commerce as "intercourse").
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evokes additional disagreement.3 When federal regulation of commerce
During the era surrounding the ratification of the Constitution, commentators described
the regulation of commerce as the regulation of "trade." See THE FEDERALIST No. 4,
supra note 1, at 49 (John Jay) (discussing "our trade [as] prudently regulated"); THE FED-
ERALIST No. 11, at 84-91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing
the advantages of a central economy and using "commerce" synonymously with "trade"
and "navigation"); THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 250 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[T]he regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government .... ");
THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 333 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("How can
the trade between the different States be duly regulated ... ?"); Oliver Ellsworth, Land-
holder VI (Dec. 10, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 230 (John P. Kaminski et al., eds., 1988) (commenting on George Ma-
son's "violent opposition to the powers given congress to regulate trade"); James Iredell,
Marcus IV (March 12, 1788), in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 380 (John P. Kaminski et al., eds., 1986) (commenting that "regula-
tions of commerce ... will give great advantage to the carrying trade of America"); ME-
LANCTHON SMITH, ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1788)
reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DUR-
ING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 107 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1968) (1888)
("Far be it from me to object to granting the general government the power of regulating
trade .... "); see also WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 84-114 (1953) (exploring the eighteenth century use of
the word commerce and maintaining it means trade); Jean Yarbrough, The Constitution
and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?, in To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE
CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION 217, 221-22 (Herman Belz et al. eds., 1992) (pro-
posing various definitions of the word commerce espoused by Motesquieu, Hume, Smith,
and other eighteenth century philosophers and asserting that the basic definition of com-
merce is trade or exchange); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1394 (1987) (asserting that commerce refers to trade and its
incidental activities). See generally DAVID HUME, Of Commerce, in ESSAYS: MORAL,
POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 253,263-64 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1987) (theorizing about com-
merce, national wealth, and political stability).
3. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 177 (1908) (defining commerce among
the several states as "traffic, intercourse, trade, navigation, communication, the transit of
persons, and the transmission of messages by telegraph"); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 398 (1905) ("[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception,
but a practical one, drawn from the course of business."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (restricting the definition of the word "among" to "commerce which
concerns more States than one"); CROSSKEY, supra note 2, at 17 (defining interstate and
intrastate commerce). William Crosskey describes intrastate commerce as "commercial
transactions that take place wholly within the territory of a single state" whereas interstate
commerce includes "commercial transactions that are carried on from a point in the terri-
tory of one state to a point in the territory of another." Id.
One commentator suggests that the choice of the words "among the several states" was a
matter of style. Raoul Berger, State and Federal Powers: The Founders' Design, in Is CON-
STITUTIONAL REFORM NECESSARY To REINVIGORATE FEDERALISM? A ROUNDTABLE
DISCUSSION 7, 10-11 (Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations No. M-152,
1987). Professor Berger notes that the Founders originally employed the phrase "with the
several states" instead of "among the several states." Id. at 10. Berger further maintains
that the word "among" was commonly substituted with the word "between." Id. at 11.
The frequent substitution of the word "between" indicates that the Founders' primary goal
was to protect the states from each other and not to grant the federal government power
over the internal police matters of the state. Id.; see RICHARD H. LEE, LETTERS OF A
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among the several states, or interstate commerce, results in regulation of
intrastate activities, the Supreme Court must adhere to principles inher-
ent in the concept of Federalism4 and the Tenth Amendment.'
FEDERAL FARMER, No. III (1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 301
(Paul L. Ford ed., 1968) (1888) ("[T]o regulate trade between the states ... without essen-
tially effecting the internal police of the respective states ...."); THE FEDERALIST No. 23,
at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Tlhe regulation of commerce
with other nations and between the States .. "); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 1, at
267 (James Madison) ("The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the
commerce between its several members .... ); THE FEDERALIST No. 53, supra note 2, at
333 (James Madison) ("How can the trade between different States be duly regulated ...
4. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (articulating the principle of federalism as embodied in the Constitution). Madison
explained:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce .... The powers re-
served to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important
in times of war and danger; those of the State governments in times of peace and
security.
Id. (emphasis added). As described by Madison, this federal structure is established in the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating eighteen specific powers reserved
for the national government including the power to make all laws "necessary and proper"
for carrying out those enumerated powers); Id. § 10 (denying states the power to issue
money, enter into treaties, levy export and import duties, and keep troops during wartime);
U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states all powers not delegated to the national
government); see also Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Un-
steady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447
(1995) (proposing the Court adopt a more consistent approach to applying the principles of
federalism); Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1987) (tracing the Supreme
Court's various approaches to constitutional federalism). But cf. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 258 (1980) (advocating that the
Supreme Court refuse to review federalism questions and, instead, reserve its capital for
other matters); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 558-60 (1954) (asserting that the Court is on its weakest ground when confronting
issues of federalism and arguing that the national political process is the more appropriate
mechanism for safeguarding the federal system).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.; see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568-72 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (recounting the reasons
for the inclusion of the Tenth Amendment and noting that the promise of federalism en-
sured ratification of the Constitution); see infra notes 43, 88, 116, & 120 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's treatment of the Tenth Amendment).
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In an attempt to balance the federal government's power to regulate
interstate commerce with the states' authority to regulate intrastate activ-
ity, the Supreme Court has adopted various analytical models for inter-
preting the federal commerce power.6 Before 1937, the Court vacillated
between a formalistic direct/indirect test and a more lenient instrumental-
ities rationale.7 The Court used the direct/indirect test to distinguish be-
tween activities such as manufacturing and commerce.8 The Court later
applied the instrumentalities rationale to regulate the means by which
goods and other products of commerce were moved interstate. 9 In 1937,
however, the Court abandoned the formalistic restrictions on the national
commerce authority and began a trend of consistent validation of con-
gressional use of the commerce power.1"
6. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case),
234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (using the instrumentalities rationale); Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at
398 (applying the current of commerce rationale); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (using the direct/indirect test).
7. Compare E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12 (holding that Congress lacked authority to
regulate manufacturing because it only indirectly affected interstate commerce) with The
Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351 (holding that Congress had authority to regulate
railroads because they were instruments of interstate commerce).
8. See Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584, 587 (1934) (commenting that
production is not commerce but only a step in the preparation for commerce); E.C. Knight,
156 U.S. at 12 (stating that "[clommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.");
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888) (stating "No distinction is more popular to the
common mind, or more clearly expressed in economic and political literature, than that
between manufactures and commerce."); see cases cited infra notes 33, 46 & 64 and accom-
panying text (distinguishing manufacturing from commerce).
9. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351 (applying the instrumentalities ra-
tionale to regulate railroads). Under the instrumentalities rationale, federal regulation of
interstate railroads included:
all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the
control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of
the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which inter-
state commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or
hindrance.
Id.; see infra part L.A (exploring the holding of The Shreveport Rate Case).
10. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985)
(holding that the federal government could regulate a municipally owned and operated
mass transit system); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
277 (1981) (noting the Court uses a rational basis test to determine whether an activity
substantially affects interstate commerce); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57
(1971) (determining that Congress could regulate organized crime and loan-sharking activ-
ities even when they occurred entirely within a single state); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (holding that Congress could prohibit racial
discrimination in hotels under the commerce clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 304 (1964) (holding that Congress could prohibit racial discrimination in restaurants
under the commerce clause); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (concluding that
the federal government could regulate intrastate activities if the aggregate effect of those
activities has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce); United States v.
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Under the commerce clause, the Court has upheld federal civil rights
laws, federal regulation of state entities, and federal criminal laws.1'
Although the Court has been willing to validate virtually all commerce-
based legislation, the Court has articulated limits on the commerce
12 1power. In United States v. Lopez,' 3 the Court finally determined that
Congress exceeded its commerce authority by attempting to regulate
guns within 1,000 feet of a school zone. 4
Lopez involved the indictment of a high school student who brought a
.38 caliber handgun to school in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act (The Act).15 The student pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (validating Congress's authority to prohibit the shipment
of items in interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937) (holding that the federal government may regulate intrastate activities so long as
those activities have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce). But see New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the federal government may
not coerce a state to enforce a federal regulatory program).
11. See cases discussed infra parts I.D.1, I.D.2, and I.D.3 (upholding civil rights legisla-
tion, federal regulation of state entities, and federal criminal laws that are based on the
commerce power).
12. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (requiring Congress to clearly
state its purpose in statutes that would significantly alter the federal-state balance); Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968) (noting that Congress may never use a trivial impact
on interstate commerce as justification for federal regulation). Only twice since 1937, how-
ever, has the Court invalidated a federal commerce-based statute. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (invalidating the "take title" provision of a federal com-
merce-based statute); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (invali-
dating federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions based on the commerce
power), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528; see infra notes 114 & 117 (discussing the
decision in National League of Cities); infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (examin-
ing the holding in New York v. United States).
13. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
14. Id. at 1634.
15. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995). On March 10, 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a senior at Edison High School in San
Antonio, Texas, went to school carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun. Id. Lopez ad-
mitted that he was carrying the gun when school officials, relying on an anonymous tip,
confronted him. Id. Lopez was carrying the unloaded gun and five bullets for another
individual who planned to use it in a gang war. Id. The State of Texas initially charged
Lopez under a Texas law that classified carrying a firearm on school property as a third
degree felony. Id. at 1345 n.1. However, these charges were dropped so that the federal
government could prosecute Lopez under the federal Gun-Free School Zones statute. Id.
The original Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 provided:
(A) It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the possession of a firearm-
(i) on private property not part of school grounds;
(ii) if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by the State in
which the school zone is located or a political subdivision of the State, and
the law of the State or political subdivision requires that, before an individual
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1459
the indictment on the ground that section 922(q) of the Act, which
banned possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, did not
further any enumerated power granted to Congress by the Constitution. 16
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied
the motion, finding that the federal statute derived its authority from the
commerce clause. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed, however, finding the Act beyond the scope of the com-
merce clause.' 8 The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the statute
mentioned neither the commerce clause nor the impact of guns in school
zones, the court could not determine if the regulated activity was ration-
ally related to interstate commerce. 19
obtain such a license, the law enforcement authorities of the State or political
subdivision verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive the
license;
(iii) which is-
(I) not loaded; and
(II) in a locked container, or a locked firearms rack which is on a motor
vehicle;
(iv) by an individual for use in a program approved by a school in the school
zone;
(v) by an individual in accordance with a contract entered into between a
school in the school zone and the individual or an employer of the individual;
(vi) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capacity; or;
(vii) that is unloaded and is possessed by an individual while traversing
school premises for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands
open to hunting, if the entry on school premises is authorized by school
authorities.
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2125 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1)(A)-(2)(A)(1994)). The Act defined a school zone as "(A) in, or on the
grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or (B) within a distance of 1,000 feet from
the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)(A)-(B)(1988).
See generally Joseph Calve, Anatomy of a Landmark: How A San Antonio Public De-
fender Bucked Congress, the ATF and More Than a Half-Century of Supreme Court Prece-
dent to Alter the Balance of Power and, not Incidentally, Change the Course of a Teen-ager's
Life, TEX. LAWYER, July 31, 1995, at 1 (describing John Carter, the attorney who repre-
sented Alfonso Lopez, and offering insight into his preparation of the case).
16. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.
17. Id. The district court found that the business of elementary, middle, and high
schools affected interstate commerce. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1363-64; see supra note 15 (providing the original text of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990); infra note 225 and accompanying text (explaining that the
statute did not contain the word commerce).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari,2" and affirmed the decision of
the Fifth Circuit.2 ' The Court held that the federal commerce power ex-
tends to noncommercial intrastate activities only when those activities
"substantially affect[ ] interstate commerce. 22 The Court found that the
noncommercial activity of possessing a gun in a school zone did not sub-
stantially affect commerce and invalidated the Act.23 Additionally, the
majority noted that the statute did not contain a jurisdictional element
limiting the Act to only those intrastate firearm possessions that actually
affected interstate commerce.24
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred, emphasizing
the importance of federalism. 25 According to Justice Kennedy, maintain-
20.. United States v. Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). The Court granted certiorari to
resolve a split among the circuit courts. See James M. Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipo-
tent Congress: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Posses-
sion, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795 (1994) (discussing the intercircuit split). Compare United
States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (finding the
Gun-Free School Zones Act an invalid exercise of the commerce power) with United
States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993) (disagreeing with the analysis in the
Lopez decision).
21. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995). The majority consisted of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 1625.
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Id. at 1651-58.
The Court's holding received much attention in the press and one commentator pointed
out:
Last November, on the day that voters were electing the most anti-Washington
Congress since before the New Deal, the Supreme Court was hearing oral argu-
ment in United States v. Lopez, a case that questioned the very foundations of the
post-New Deal world. Conventional wisdom was stunned by the results of the
November election. It was shocked again late last month when the Court handed
down its decision in Lopez.
Roger Pilon, It's Not About Guns: The Court's Lopez Decision Is Really About Limits on
Government, WASH. POST, May 21, 1995, at C5.
Another commentator noted:
The decision immediately acquired extra resonance because of the Oklahoma
City bombing. In the aftermath of that tragedy, President Clinton and Republi-
can leaders have demanded broader investigative powers for federal agencies to
combat domestic groups that use explosives and firearms for deadly ends. Mean-
while, new attention is focusing on citizen militia groups and their assertions that
gun control laws are the leading edge of a federal conspiracy to trample their
constitutional rights.
Joan Biskupic, Ban on Guns Near Schools is Rejected: Congress Exceeded Commerce
Power, High Court Holds, WASH. POST, April 27, 1995, at Al.
22. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630; see infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text (mention-
ing the Court's decision to adopt the "substantially affects" test).
23. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
24. Id. at 1631; see infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text (describing the Gun Free
School Zones Act's lack of a jurisdictional element).
25. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra part II.B.1 (discuss-
ing Justice Kennedy's concurrence).
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ing this federal-state balance ensures political accountability, especially
with regard to traditional state concerns.2 6 Justice Thomas concurred
separately to explain how far modern commerce clause jurisprudence has
deviated from the original meaning of the clause.2 7 Justice Thomas re-
jected the substantial effects test adopted by the majority, and strongly
urged the Court to fashion a more coherent and limited application of the
commerce clause.2 8 Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the rational
basis test was applicable despite the absence of specific congressional
findings linking guns in school zones to interstate commerce. 29 In apply-
ing this rational basis test, Justice Breyer steadfastly maintained that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act was valid.3" Justice Breyer speculated that
the majority's decision would create uncertainty regarding Congress's
commerce power.3' He maintained that as a consequence of this uncer-
tainty, congressional ability to use the commerce power to regulate on a
national scale would be significantly undermined, threatening the eco-
nomic and social well-being of the nation.32
This Note traces the development of commerce clause jurisprudence
over the past two centuries. This Note first discusses the Supreme
Court's initially restrictive nineteenth century interpretation of the com-
merce clause. Then, this Note surveys the more expansive application of
the commerce power after 1937, during which the Court adopted the sub-
stantial effects test, the commerce-prohibiting technique, and the aggre-
gate effects theory. Next this Note presents the Court's modern
definition of the commerce clause, which permits federal regulation of all
activities rationally related to interstate commerce. This Note then ana-
26. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638-40; see infra notes 174-87 and accompanying text (exam-
ining Justice Kennedy's opinion regarding traditional state concerns).
27. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring); see infra part II.B.2 (reviewing
Justice Thomas's concurrence).
28. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642-43; see infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (sur-
veying Justice Thomas's rejection of the substantially affects test and advocacy of a limited
commerce clause jurisprudence).
29. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra part II.C (discussing
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion). Notably, Justice Breyer read portions of his dissent
from the bench, which was quite unusual. Biskupic, supra note 21, at A6.
30. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659; see infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text (recount-
ing Justice Breyer's application of the rational basis test).
31. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1664-65; see infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (refer-
ring to Justice Breyer's concerns about legal uncertainty).
32. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1664. Justice Breyer asserted "the legal uncertainty now cre-
ated will restrict Congress's ability to enact criminal laws aimed at criminal behavior that,
considered problem by problem rather than instance by instance, seriously threatens the
economic, as well as social well-being of Americans." Id. at 1665; see infra note 218 and
accompanying text (noting Justice Breyer's apprehensions regarding threats to social and
economic well-being).
1466 [Vol. 45:1459
1996] Reaffirming the Federal Commerce Power 1467
lyzes the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in United States v.
Lopez, and illustrates that the majority remained faithful to precedent,
maintained the federal balance, and respected the original meaning of the
commerce power. Finally, this Note argues that the primary dissent's ra-
tionale disregards federalism and ignores the true purpose of the com-
merce clause.
I. ORIGINS OF THE COMMERCE POWER
Initially, the Supreme Court's review of the commerce power centered
on the invocation of the dormant commerce clause.33 In dormant com-
merce clause disputes, the Court recognized the commerce power as a
means of determining the limits of state power to regulate, rather than as
33. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (recounting the development of
commerce jurisprudence, and noting that the Court rarely addressed the affirmative as-
pects of the commerce power); Wallace Mendelson, Introduction to FELIX FRANKFURTER,
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 7 (Quadrangle Paper-
backs 1964) (1937) (remarking that, until 1888, the Supreme Court used the commerce
clause as a restrictive device to limit the states' powers rather than as an affirmative device
to promote national commerce); see also Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the
National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946) (noting that Congress made
no substantial, affirmative use of the commerce power for the first one hundred years
following the signing of the Constitution).
Dormant commerce clause issues arise when Congress has not enacted legislation pre-
empting state commerce regulation and, as a result of this silence, states legislate. See
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) ("[n the absence of conflicting
legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing
matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or
even, to some extent, regulate it."). When this state regulation discriminates against out-
of-state residents or businesses, or unduly burdens interstate commerce, the Court will
invalidate the regulation as violative of the commerce clause. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) (striking down an Iowa statute regulat-
ing truck length prohibitions because the regulation burdened interstate commerce); Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-53 (1977) (invalidating
a North Carolina apple packaging regulation because of the discriminatory effect the regu-
lation had on Washington apple growers); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520,
528 (1959) (holding an Illinois law requiring contoured mudguards on trucks invalid be-
cause there was a "rather massive showing of burden on interstate commerce"); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (declaring a Wisconsin ordinance invalid
because the milk pasteurizing and sale requirements plainly discriminated against inter-
state commerce); Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 773-74 (invalidating an Arizona Train Limit
Law prohibiting certain railroad trains because the prohibition imposed a burden on inter-
state commerce); Baldwin v. G.A.F Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (finding a New
York law regulating milk prices invalid because the regulation discriminated against out-of-
state milk producers); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (invalidating a state
licensing requirement for vendors of steamships); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16
(1925) (concluding that a licensing requirement to operate a passenger and freight line was
invalid because the regulation imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce).
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an affirmative device for promoting national regulatory power.34 The
reasoning and legal principles that the Court established in these dormant
commerce clause cases, however, also laid the foundation for an eventual
affirmative exercise of the national commerce power.
Chief Justice Marshall's landmark opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden36 de-
fined the scope of the national commerce power.37 In Gibbons, Chief
Justice Marshall defined commerce as "intercourse" that extended into
each state. 38 Thus, Congress could regulate all commercial activity with
the exception of purely intrastate activity. 39
34. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 107 (1890) (invalidating an Iowa ban on the
importation of alcohol without county certification because the ban violated the commerce
clause); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-24 (1888) (determining that the manufacture of
intoxicating liquors was subject to state regulation because manufacture itself was not com-
merce); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 573-74 (1853) (upholding a state law grant-
ing a navigation monopoly over a purely intrastate river); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 578 (1852) (invalidating a state statute author-
izing a bridge because the bridge might interfere with commerce); Brown v. Maryland, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 425 (1827) (invalidating a state tax because the tax encroached on
the federal government's power to regulate the sale of imports); see also Mendelson, supra
note 33, at 7 (proposing that the Court initially used the commerce power as a restrictive
instrument).
35. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824) (defining commerce as
"intercourse"); Charles B. Schweitzer, Comment, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and
the Federal Docket: The Impact of United States v. Lopez, 34 Duo. L. REV. 71, 86 (1995)
(noting that early pronouncements involving the dormant commerce clause affected the
Court's interpretation of the affirmative exercise of the commerce power).
36. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the Court confronted the issue of
whether the State of New York could grant a monopoly to a private company. Id. at 1-2.
Ogden possessed a permit that his predecessors, Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton,
obtained granting the exclusive navigation rights in the waters of New York. Id. at 2.
Gibbons possessed a federal license to carry on coastal trade and wanted to navigate the
waters between New York and New Jersey. Id. Relying on his federal navigation license,
Gibbons challenged the state law granting Ogden an exclusive right to navigate the waters
within New York. Id. Chief Justice Marshall found the New York statute invalid because
it was preempted by a federal licensing statute. Id. at 210-11. Essentially, the invalidation
of the New York Law was based on the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 211.
37. Id. at 189. Chief Justice Marshall realized, "The subject to be regulated is com-
merce; and our constitution being ... one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascer-
tain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word." Id.
38. Id. Chief Justice Marshall explained that, "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but
it is something more: it is intercourse." Id. The federal government's power over com-
merce among the several states "cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State,
but may be introduced into the interior." Id. at 194.
39. Id. at 194. Chief Justice Marshall defined a state's internal activities as those
"which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with
which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general
powers of the government." Id. at 195 (emphasis added). The Court later referred to this
language as the affecting commerce rationale. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) ("Chief Justice Marshall
described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded."). But cf. Ep-
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A. E.C. Knight and The Shreveport Rate Case: Divergent Approaches
to the National Commerce Power
Active promotion of national power was suitable for the century fol-
lowing the Gibbons decision because the nation's economy was ex-
panding.4° Congress sought to exert national power over commerce with
legislation such as the Interstate Commerce Act of 188741 and the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act.42 Because active promotion of national commerce
authority often reached intrastate activities, the Court had to determine
whether these regulations over intrastate activities were valid; as a result,
the Court developed two analytical models.43 The Court adopted a re-
strictive direct/indirect effects test4" and a more lenient instrumentalities
of commerce rationale.45
The Court developed the direct/indirect test when it reviewed the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co. ,46 the Court held
stein, supra note 2, at 1394-95 (asserting that Chief Justice Marshall's definition of com-
merce has been interpreted incorrectly in that it was not meant to be such a broad grant of
federal power).
40. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (1991). During the nineteenth cen-
tury, the nation experienced growth in industry, transportation, and communication. Id.
National economic problems paralleled this rapid growth, and Congress responded with
national regulation. Id.
41. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
42. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121 (commenting on the Interstate
Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act). These Acts ushered "in new phases of
adjudication, which required the Court to approach the interpretation of the Commerce
Clause in the light of an actual exercise by Congress of its power thereunder." Id.
43. Cf. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (formulating a "current of
commerce" rationale). The "current of commerce" rationale permitted federal regulation
of intrastate activities if those intrastate activities were connected to interstate movement
of goods or services. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.5, at 378 (4th ed. 1992), This analysis "tem-
pered" the strict application of the Tenth Amendment. Id.
44. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (stating that an indirect
effect on trade or commerce was not enough).
45. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (explaining that Con-
gress's authority extended to interstate carriers because they were intruments of interstate
commerce).
46. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). In E.C. Knight, the American Sugar Refining Company (Amer-
ican) violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by acquiring the stock of four other American
sugar refineries. Id. at 3. Before American acquired these four companies, it controlled
65% of the sugar production in the United States. Id. After American acquired the four
companies, it controlled approximately 98% of the sugar refined in the United States. Id.
The government asserted that this ownership violated the Sherman Antitrust Act because
it was an attempt to monopolize trade. Id. at 2. The Sherman Act was enacted "to protect
trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies" and provided in part
that, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in re-
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that Congress could use the commerce power to regulate monopolies in
commerce, but not to regulate monopolies in manufacturing because
"[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it."'4 7 The
Court noted that the national commerce power did not extend to all ac-
tivities that might indirectly affect commerce.48 If national power ex-
tended to all activities that ultimately affected commerce, no affairs
would be left for the states to regulate. 49 The Court, instead, maintained
that the national commerce power extended only to those activities that
directly affected commerce, as distinguished from those that indirectly af-
fected commerce such as manufacturing.5"
straint of trade or commerce among the several states, is illegal." Id. The Court, however,
found that the company's acquisition of other refineries was not covered by the Sherman
Act. Id. at 16-17. Even though the products manufactured by the refineries were involved
in interstate trade, this monopoly over manufacture itself affected commerce only "indi-
rectly." Id. at 17.
47. Id. at 12. Chief Justice Fuller borrowed this manufacture/commerce distinction
from Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1,(1888), where the Court reviewed a state statute prohibit-
ing the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within a state. In Kidd, the Court explained the
difference between manufacture and commerce: manufacture was the transforming of raw
materials into useable goods, while commerce consisted of the buying, selling, and trans-
portation of those goods. Id. at 20. The Court held that even though the manufacturer
intended to export the liquor after it was made, the intent of the manufacturer did not
determine when the article passed into commerce. Id. at 24. Thus, the state statute was
valid because it aimed at only the manufacture of the liquor and did not interfere with the
federal government's power to regulate commerce. Id.
48. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16. Chief Justice Fuller stated that "if the national power
extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other
productive industries, whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively
little of business operations and affairs would be left for state control." Id.
49. Id. This idea of the independent powers of the state serving as a limitation on
federal lawmaking powers is known as "dual federalism." See McCullough v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819) ("In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided be-
tween the government of the Union, and those of the States."). Chief Justice Marshall
went on to note that, "[The Union and the states] are each sovereign, with respect to the
objects committed to it, and neither are sovereign with respect to the objects committed to
the other." Id. This notion of dual federalism saw its demise with the Court's shift in 1937.
See infra part I.C (describing the Court's shift in 1937 toward approving extensive national
lawmaking). Thus, the idea of dual federalism is no longer a constraint on federal lawmak-
ing powers. See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1950) (recounting the demise of dual federalism); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and
Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1796-1816 (1995) (remarking on dual federalism's em-
phasis on localism).
50. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16-17. According to Chief Justice Fuller, Congress in-
tended the Sherman Antitrust Act to reach contracts and conspiracies to monopolize trade
and commerce. Id. at 17. The goal of American, however, was to gain control over the
manufacturing of sugar. Id. As long as the company did not try to control interstate com-
merce to obtain this goal, activities related to monopolizing manufacture were beyond the
federal government's reach because they only had an indirect effect on commerce. Id.
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The formalistic direct/indirect approach of E.C. Knight, however, was
not as suitably applied to the railroads as it had been to the sugar refining
industry."1 Consequently, the Court adopted a more lenient approach
which permitted federal regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. 52 In The Shreveport Rate Case, 3 the Court held that the rail-
roads were instruments of interstate commerce and, therefore, Congress
maintained the authority to regulate them. 4
B. Initial Hostility Toward New Deal Legislation
During the 1930s, the economic crisis of the Great Depression plagued
the nation.55 To relieve the nation's economic problems, the federal gov-
ernment wielded its commerce power to enact aggressive legislation
aimed at reviving the country's depressed economy. 6 Initially, the Court
51. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914) (adopting a more leni-
ent instrumentalities approach to evaluate the application of the commerce power to the
railroad industry).
52. See id. (discussing the instrumentalities rationale); United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1624, 1636 (1995) (recalling the reasoning behind the instrumentalities approach).
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that congressional regulations on intrastate rates were ac-
ceptable "'by reason of the interblending of the interstate and intrastate operations of in-
terstate carriers' [that] the regulation of interstate rates could not be maintained without
restrictions on 'intrastate rates which substantially affect the former."' Id. (quoting Minne-
sota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 432-33 (1913)).
53. 234 U.S. 342 (1914), The Shreveport Rate Case involved a railroad company that
established intrastate hauling rates significantly lower than interstate rates. Id. at 345. The
Interstate Commerce Commission found that the rates discriminated against interstate
traffic, and directed the railroad companies to eliminate the disparate rate structures. Id.
at 347. The railroad companies challenged the order on the ground that Congress did not
have the power to control the intrastate rates of an interstate carrier. Id. at 350.
54. Id. at 351; see also The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,564 (1870) (determining
a ship was an instrumentality of commerce and, therefore, federal safety regulations were
applicable).
55. FREDERICK E. HOSEN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL vii (1992).
Nationwide increases in unemployment, a loss in the value of goods and services, and
human suffering marked the era of the Great Depression. Id. Under President Roosevelt,
the federal government attempted to alleviate the national economic crisis through federal
legislation. Id. at vii-viii. Roosevelt's "New Deal" was a series of federal regulations
aimed at improving the national economy in areas such as banking, employment, unem-
ployment, housing, agriculture, transportation, salaries and wages, credit, and insurance.
Id. at viii. Congress adopted the "affecting commerce" rationale in order to justify federal
regulation. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 4.9, at 158.
56. See generally HOSEN, supra note 55 (detailing the Roosevelt administration's legis-
lative acts aimed at improving the country's economy). President Roosevelt described the
New Deal as an era in which the federal government "was going to use affirmative action
to bring about its avowed objectives." 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
5 (1938).
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1459
applied the formalistic standards of E.C. Knight which proved unfavora-
ble to the federal government's attempts to regulate.57
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States5 8 exemplified the
Court's initial unwillingness to approve extensive federal regulation
under the commerce clause.59 In Schechter, the Court invalidated the
wage and hour provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and
held that Congress only had the authority to regulate activity that directly
affected interstate commerce.60 Because the wages and hours of employ-
ees only had an indirect effect on commerce,'Congress could not invoke
the federal commerce power to regulate wages and hours.6' Thus, the
Court chose E.C. Knight's formalistic standards, and affirmed that it only
would uphold federal regulations under the commerce power if the regu-
lated activity had a direct effect on interstate commerce.62
Maximum hour and minimum wage provisions in coal mines under the
National Labor Relations Act also were challenged as an unconstitutional
exercise of the commerce power.63 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co. ,64 the
Court invalidated the wage and hour provisions of the Act because they
regulated the production of coal and not commerce.65 Thus, Schechter
and Carter Coal rejected the expansive interpretation of the commerce
clause adopted in The Shreveport Rate Case, and followed the restrictive
57. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895) (holding that Con-
gress may only use the commerce clause to regulate activities that have a direct effect on
interstate commerce).
58. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
59. See id. at 550. Schechter involved wage and hour regulations established by the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Id. at 521-22. The NIRA authorized the presi-
dent to approve codes of fair competition. Id. at 521 n.4. The defendant, Schechter, chal-
lenged the NIRA, asserting that it was not a valid exercise of the commerce power, and the
Court agreed. Id. at 520. Because Schechter only slaughtered and sold poultry to local
dealers and butchers, none of Schechter's business involved interstate transactions. Id. at
543; see also Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 372-74 (1935) (invalidat-
ing the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 as not within the bounds of interstate commerce).
60. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546.
61. Id. at 550; see THOMAS I. EMERSON, YOUNG LAWYER FOR THE NEW DEAL: AN
INSIDER'S MEMOIR OF THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 26 (1991) (recognizing that the decision in
Schechter rendered the entire NIRA invalid in part on the basis of commerce).
62. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 550. In his concurrence, Justice Cardozo noted, "Activities
local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because of distant repercus-
sions." Id. at 554.
63. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936).
64. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
65. Id. at 304. Production, like manufacture, was a local activity that had only an
indirect effect on commerce. Id; see supra notes 46-47 (discussing the origin and applica-
tion of this manufacture/commerce distinction). The direct/indirect distinction was based
on "the manner in which the effect has been brought about," causing one to question "the
relation between the activity or condition and the effect?" Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 308.
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path paved by E.C. Knight.66 As a result, these holdings thwarted Presi-
dent Roosevelt's attempts to solve the economic crisis through national
legislation.67
C. The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The Court's stance regarding the federal commerce power dramatically
shifted in 1937.68 During this period, the Court upheld federal regulation
66. See EMERSON, supra note 61, at 77. Professor Emerson, a young New Deal lawyer
for the government, notes that the decision in Carter Coal, even more so than the decision
in Schechter, indicated that the Court would find the National Labor Relations Act uncon-
stitutional. Id.
67. To preserve remaining New Deal legislation, President Roosevelt proposed a bill
to reorganize the federal judiciary and "pack the Court" with more judges who would
allow more federal regulation. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 83. This bill, more commonly
referred to as the Court-packing plan, proposed that:
when any judge of a court of the United States ... has ... attained the age of
seventy years ... and within six months thereafter has neither resigned nor re-
tired, the President, for each such judge who has not so resigned or retired, shall
nominate and, by the advice and consent of Senate, shall appoint one additional
judge to the court to which the former is commissioned .... [No judge shall] be
so appointed if such appointment would result in ... more than fifteen members
of the Supreme Court of the United States ....
S. 1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1937).
When Roosevelt proposed this measure, six justices were over seventy years old; there-
fore, Roosevelt would have been able to appoint six additional justices, resulting in a fif-
teen justice Supreme Court bench. GUNTHER, supra note 40, at 122. Reaction to
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan was negative, and the Senate emphatically rejected the
bill. See S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937) (Reorganization of the Federal
Judiciary, Adverse Report of the Committee on the Judiciary). In a letter to Senator Bur-
ton K. Wheeling, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes assured the Senator that the Court
was "fully abreast of its work" and he maintained that any change in the number of justices
to the Court would not promote efficiency. GUNTHER, supra note 40, at 123. Yet, the
mere proposal of the bill seemed to impact the Court. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 87.
Many Washington attorneys at the time determined that the decision in Jones & Laughlin
was the Court's way of protecting itself from Roosevelt's packing plan and aligning the
Court's decisions with the spirit of the New Deal era. Id. One New Deal attorney recalls a
conversation with Justice Benjamin Cardozo regarding Roosevelt's plan, during which Car-
dozo cautiously agreed that the Supreme Court had "damaged its prestige" and that the
Court "did not have the power, political backing, or prestige to survive as an obstacle to...
irresistible social forces." Id. at 84; see infra part I.C.1 (discussing the Jones & Laughlin
decision).
68. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40-67 (1993) (surveying the
legal revolution of 1937). This shift in the Court's commerce jurisprudence was paralleled
by a shift in the Court's stance regarding contract and property rights. Id. Professor Sun-
stein maintains that during the New Deal, the Court abandoned the "status-quo" neutrality
that dominated the Court's decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Id. at 40. But see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201,249
(1994) (proposing that the Court's shift in its stance on New Deal legislation was attributa-
ble to poorly drafted statutes); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought
Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
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of intrastate activities if the commerce-based regulation: (1) had a sub-
stantial economic effect on interstate commerce; 69 (2) could be regulated
through the commerce-prohibiting technique;71 or (3) affected, in the ag-
gregate, interstate commerce.71 In addition to these rationales, the Court
conducted a rational basis review of commerce legislation so that the reg-
ulations were valid if the means were rationally related to a legitimate
government end.72
1. The Substantial Economic Effect Rationale
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.7 3 ushered in this new era of
national commerce power. For the first time, the Court held that Con-
gress may regulate intrastate activities if those activities had a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce.7 4 Jones & Laughlin involved
a steel company that violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
by engaging in unfair labor practices.75 The Court held that Congress
could regulate labor relations because the steel industry was organized on
a national scale7 6 and because the ability of workers to organize and con-
1891, 1895 (1994) (asserting the Court's shift was gradual and began prior to the 1937
"crisis").
69. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1937) (finding that
unfair labor practices had a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
70. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122 (1941) (finding that goods produced
under substandard working conditions had a substantial impact on interstate commerce).
71. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (finding consumption of home-
grown wheat, in the aggregate, had a substantial impact on commerce).
72. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 121 (employing a rational basis level of review).
73. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
74. Id. at 37.
75. Id. at 22. The NLRB argued that the steel company used discriminatory hiring
practices against union members that interfered with labor organization. Id. The National
Labor Relations Act authorized the NLRB to make findings demonstrating the impact of
employers' unfair labor practices on commerce and to take steps to prevent those prac-
tices. Id. at 23 n.2. The steel company contended that the NLRA was invalid because it
used the federal commerce power to regulate local activity. Id. at 29. The steel company
argued that the industrial relations and activities of the company involved manufacturing,
rather than commerce. Id. at 34; see supra notes 8, 47, & 65 (distinguishing between pro-
duction and manufacture). Although the steel company employees were engaged in manu-
facturing, the Court did not find this factor determinative. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at
40.
76. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41. In this case, Jones & Laughlin was the fourth
largest producer of steel in the United States, and had nineteen subsidiaries throughout the
country, as well as sales offices in twenty cities. Id. at 26-27. Moreover, Jones & Laughlin
Steel was a completely integrated enterprise. Id. Thus, the Court questioned:
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to
interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be main-
tained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which
Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from
the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?
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duct collective bargaining, albeit an intrastate activity, had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.77 By adopting this "close and substantial
relation" test, the Court abandoned the direct/indirect test of E.C. Knight
and reinvigorated the broader "affecting commerce" rationale developed
in Gibbons.7
8
2. The Commerce-Prohibiting Technique
In addition to reinvigorating the broad affecting commerce rationale,
the Court also developed a new "commerce-prohibiting" analysis.7 9 This
commerce-prohibiting technique enhanced Congress's power in two
ways. By utilizing the commerce prohibiting technique, Congress could
(1) prohibit goods not produced in compliance with federal regulation
from entering interstate commerce,80 and (2) regulate intrastate activity if
the activity had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.8' The Court
consistently approved Congress's use of this technique by applying a def-
erential rational basis standard of review.82
In United States v. Darby,83 the Court upheld wage and hour provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as a valid exercise of the federal
commerce power.84 Darby involved the interstate shipment of lumber
products that were produced in violation of the minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour provisions of the FLSA.8 5 The Court held that Congress may
Id. at 41; cf. infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's concur-
rence in Lopez and his criticism of federal commerce regulation of activities on a "na-
tional" scale).
77. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41-42. The Court determined that control over local
activities "is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstruc-
tions, [therefore,] Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control." Id. at 37
(citing Schechter). The Court also noted that the question of what is "local" and what is
"national" is one of degree. Id.
78. See supra part I (introducing the affecting commerce rationale employed in
Gibbons).
79. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122 (1941) (permitting federal regulation
of goods produced under substandard working conditions).
80. Id. at 115.
81. Id. at 122. In essence, the Court abandoned the distinction between manufactur-
ing and commerce. See supra notes 47 & 65 (discussing the manufacturing/commerce dis-
tinction espoused in previous cases).
82. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118. The Court asserted that the government need only show
that the regulation was an "appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end." Id.
83. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
84. Id. at 122.
85. Id. at 108. Petitioner confronted the Court with the issue of whether Congress
could prohibit the interstate shipment of lumber products produced in violation of the
wage and hour regulations. Id. The Court also addressed whether Congress could regulate
a purely local activity, such as manufacturing, to prohibit certain goods from entering inter-
state commerce. Id.
1996] 1475
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1459
prohibit goods from entering interstate commerce.86 Because Congress
had plenary power over commerce, the Court held that the federal gov-
ernment could prohibit any article from entering interstate commerce,
regardless of the motive and purpose of the regulation.87
The Court also asserted that Congress could regulate a purely local
activity as a means of regulating interstate commerce. 88 According to the
Court, federal wage and hour regulations eliminated substandard work-
ing conditions, thereby facilitating fair competition among producers of
goods in interstate commerce.89 The Court conducted a rational basis
review and found the regulations an appropriate means to attaining the
legitimate end of regulating interstate commerce. 90 Dispensing with the
direct relationship test, the Court held that the government merely had to
show that goods produced under substandard working conditions would
affect commerce.
91
3. The Aggregate Theory
The development of the affecting commerce rationale culminated in
the 1942 case Wickard v. Filburn.92 In Wickard, the Court extended the
affecting commerce rationale to include intrastate activities that, in the
86. Id. at 115-16.
87. Id. The Court noted "regulations of commerce which do not infringe some consti-
tutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce
Clause." Id.
The Court also expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Darby,
312 U.S. at 116. Hammer involved a federal law prohibiting the interstate transportation
of goods that were produced by child labor. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 252-53. The Hammer
Court held that Congress could only prohibit interstate transportation of articles that were
inherently harmful. Id. at 271-72. In Darby, however, the Court maintained that Congress
could prohibit any goods from entering interstate commerce regardless of whether the
goods were inherently harmful. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116.
88. Darby, 312 U.S. at 121. After reaching this conclusion, the Court went on to say
that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained [by the states] which has
not been surrendered." Id. at 124. The decision in Darby, therefore, effectively overruled
Carter Coal, which signified the last stand of dual federalism. See supra note 49 and ac-
companying text (discussing dual federalism); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
156-57 (1992) ("[T]he Tenth Amendment itself ... is essentially a tautology.").
89. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122.
90. Id. at 121.
91. Id. at 121-22. Darby also articulated the possibility of the "superbootstrap." GUN-
THER, supra note 40, at 135-36. Although Congress has no general police power, it does
have the power to prohibit noxious items from entering commerce. Darby, 312 U.S. at
121. Because Congress has the ultimate power to prohibit the movement of noxious items
(e.g., diseased cattle) it might also have the power to regulate the production of noxious
goods without any showing that they affect commerce. See GUNTHER, supra note 40, at
135-36.
92. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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aggregate, affected interstate commerce.93 The Court held that Congress
could reach local activity, such as the production and consumption of
wheat, if that activity had a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce. 94 Even though one farmer, considered alone, might have only a
trivial impact on the market, his actions, when aggregated with those of
other farmers, would have a substantial effect.95 Wickard greatly ex-
panded the reach of the commerce clause, permitting the federal govern-
ment to regulate those local activities which, in the aggregate, affected
interstate commerce. 96 The aggregate theory signalled a return to Chief
Justice Marshall's original concept of commerce, and allowed the federal
government to reach virtually all intrastate activity.97 Deriving its au-
thority from this new commerce jurisprudence, Congress could regulate
even purely intrastate activities.98
D. Modern Applications of the Commerce Power
From 1937 to 1942, the Court continued to apply and expand the affect-
ing commerce rationale, enabling the federal government to regulate al-
most any intrastate activity. After 1942, the Court continued to extend
the commerce power into three general categories: civil rights legisla-
93. Id. at 127-29. In Wickard, a farmer challenged the federal government's authority
to regulate wheat prices. Id. at 113. The federal regulation restricted the amount of crops
a farmer could produce for market and imposed a penalty for marketing excess. Id. at 114-
15. In 1941, Wickard harvested bushels that constituted an amount in excess of his allot-
ment. Id. at 114. The farmer asserted that the production and consumption of wheat was a
local activity so that any effects on interstate commerce were indirect at most. Id. at 119.
94. Id. at 125. According to the Court, the government has the authority to regulate
the amount of wheat produced for sale on the market. Id. at 127. In addition, the govern-
ment may also regulate the amount of wheat an individual farmer produces for his own
consumption. Id. The Court reasoned that farmers who produce enough wheat to satisfy
their own personal needs do not have to purchase wheat from the market. Id. This result
impacts interstate commerce because it reduces the demand on the market. Id.
95. Id. at 127-28.
96. Id. The unanimous Court reasoned, "[tihat [Wickard's] own contribution to the
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, is far from trivial." Id. Furthermore, the Court was highly deferential in
accepting the findings of Congress that local activities in the aggregate substantially af-
fected commerce. See id. at 128-29.
97. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 160; see discussion supra part L.A (noting
Chief Justice Marshall's use of the affecting commerce rationale). But see Epstein, supra
note 2, at 1440 (asserting that the New Deal Court extended the federal commerce power
beyond Chief Justice Marshall's original intention); infra notes 193-95 and accompanying
text (presenting Justice Thomas's interpretation of the "affecting commerce" language).
98. See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942) (upholding
milk pricing regulations on milk produced and sold entirely intrastate).
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tion, 9 regulation of activities of state governmental entities, 100 and fed-
eral criminal laws.10 1 The Court consistently deferred to the findings of
Congress, and upheld legislation in all three categories.0 2
1. Civil Rights Legislation
One modern use of the commerce power is exemplified in Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the 1964 Act). 1 3 The Court validated the
constitutionality of the 1964 Act by relying on the affecting commerce
rationale, and applying the rational basis test."° The Court also indi-
cated its willingness to uphold federal regulation of purely local activities,
99. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (up-
holding Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964) (same).
100. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (uphold-
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act).
101. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 351 (1971) (upholding the Crime Control
Act); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 813-14 (1971) (upholding the Travel Act);
United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 452 (1953) (plurality opinion) (up-
holding the Gambling Devices Act).
102. See, e.g., Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (noting the Court's deference to
congressional findings in the area of interstate commerce issues); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (same); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971) (same); Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261-62 (same); Katzen-
bach, 379 U.S. at 304 (noting that even the absence of formal findings by Congress is not
fatal to the validity of the statute).
103. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201-207,78 Stat. 241,248-46 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-6 (1994)). Title II provides in part:
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of goods, serv-
ices, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of
public accommodations ... if its operations affect commerce ....
Id.
Congress debated whether this piece of social legislation should derive its authority from
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the commerce clause. Jo-
SEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., 3 CIVIL RIGHTS AcrtONS § 15.02, at 15-5 (1996).
Congress eventually chose the commerce clause as the source of authority because the
Fourteenth Amendment is only applicable to discrimination by state actors, whereas the
commerce clause would reach discrimination by private actors. Id.; see also GUNTHER,
supra note 40, at 147-51 (discussing the debate between the Kennedy Administration and
its critics as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment or the commerce clause should be
used as a source of authority). The Court upheld this commerce-based legislation as ap-
plied to hotels as well as applied to restaurants. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (involving accommodations for transient guests); Kat-
zenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (involving a local restaurant).
104. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252-53; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
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as long as Congress included findings of how the intrastate activity af-
fected interstate commerce. 10 5
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,106 the owner of a motel
located near an interstate highway challenged the constitutionality of the
1964 Act.0 7 The Court deferred to the findings of Congress and upheld
the 1964 Act.10 The Court agreed with Congress's finding that racial
discrimination in hotels affected interstate commerce, and after applying
the rational basis test, determined that the means chosen to eliminate the
discrimination were reasonable. 0 9
Katzenbach v. McClung" involved application of the 1964 Act to fam-
ily-owned restaurants."' Once again, the Court found the 1964 Act valid
under the rational basis test."' Relying on testimony given at congres-
sional hearings, the Court determined that the practice of racial discrimi-
nation at restaurants affected the interstate flow of food." 3 Furthermore,
the Court found that Congress's regulatory scheme was rationally related
to the goal of eliminating racial discrimination." 4
2. Regulation of Activities of State Entities
When federal commerce regulations interfered with state autonomy,
state entities often challenged the regulations on the basis of the Tenth
105. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252. But see Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304 (noting that
Congress need not always include formal findings). Although Title I1 of the Act did not
contain explicit findings linking discriminatory practices in hotels to interstate commerce,
the Court noted that "the record of [the Act's] ... passage is replete with evidence of the
burdens that discrimination by race or color places upon interstate commerce." Heart of
Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252.
106. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
107. Id. at 243-44.
108. Id. at 261-62; see supra note 105 (highlighting the Court's articulation of why no
congressional findings were specifically required in the Act). Congressional hearings re-
vealed that racial discrimination in hotels discouraged travel by minorities, and the Court
specifically noted that this decrease in travel affected air commerce. Heart of Atlanta, 379
U.S. at 252-53.
109. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 241. The practice of racial discrimination by busi-
nesses providing transient accommodations discouraged blacks from travelling, and Con-
gress was authorized to remove this obstruction under the commerce power. Id.
110. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
111. Id. at 296. In Katzenbach, a restaurant owner sued for injunctive relief from en-
forcement of the Civil Rights Act. Id. The Act prohibited discrimination in restaurants
that served interstate travellers or served food that had moved in interstate commerce. Id.
at 296-97. The restaurant in question did not serve interstate travellers but it did receive
approximately $70,000 worth of food that had travelled in interstate commerce. Id. at 296.
112. Id. at 304; see supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
validation of Title II in Heart of Atlanta).
113. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299.
114. Id. at 304.
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Amendment or federalism." 5 The Court typically has upheld congres-
sional regulations despite challenges asserting encroachment on state au-
tonomy." 6 Generally, the Court has upheld congressional regulations
applicable to the states as long as the regulations do not coerce a state
into accepting or administering a federal regulatory scheme. 117
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority" 8 involved em-
ployees of a metropolitan transit system who challenged federal wage and
overtime regulations as applied to the state transit." 9 First, the Court
determined that Congress may impose commercial regulations on a state
115. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (municipally-
owned mass transit system challenging Fair Labor Standards Act); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226 (1983) (state employees challenging Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (state utilities challenging Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act of 1978); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982)
(state owned railroad challenging Railway Labor Act) overruled in part by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542
(1975) (public employees challenging Economic Stabilization Act); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968) (employees of state owned schools and hospitals challenging Fair Labor
Standards Act); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (state owned railroad chal-
lenging Federal Safety Appliance Act).
116. See cases cited supra note 115 (validating federal regulations affecting state enti-
ties). In United States v. Darby, the Court announced that the Tenth Amendment was "but
a truism" thus making it difficult for a state entity to prevail with this rationale. 312 U.S. at
100, 124 (1941); see supra note 49 (discussing the concept of dual federalism and its demise
with the pronouncement in Darby).
The Court did, however, temporarily alter its position with the 1976 decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In National League of Cities, the Court held that the
federal government could not regulate the "States as States," id. at 845, and prohibited
federal legislation that would interfere with "traditional governmental functions." Id. at
852. However, the Court soon overruled National League of Cities and developed a new
model for protecting state autonomy. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57 (rejecting the traditional
government function analysis and determining that the political process and the structure
of government sufficiently protect state sovereignty); see infra notes 118-22 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Garcia).
117. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that a state
cannot be compelled to carry out a federal regulatory program). The Court noted that the
compulsory nature of the "take title" provision was unique to the Low Level Radioactive
Waste Act, in that no other federal statute contained such a provision. Id. at 177; see also
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 4.10, at 171 (asserting that this immunity from fed-
eral authority is limited to only those circumstances where a state is compelled to apply a
federal regulatory scheme).
118. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
119. Id. at 534. The employees asserted that mass transportation was traditionally a
function of state government, and therefore, the federal government was without authority
to regulate in that area. See id. at 530. In National League of Cities, the Court held that a
state is immune from federal regulation which would displace a state's right to administrate
in an area of traditional governmental functions. 426 U.S. at 852. The Court in Garcia,
however, found this test unworkable and inconsistent with federalism. Garcia, 469 U.S. at
531.
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entity without violating the sovereignty of the state, because protecting
the "States as States" against federal regulation was a matter of process
rather than result.12° Second, the Court maintained that the structure of
the federal government itself would further safeguard the role of the
states in the federal system.' 21 Therefore, no affirmative limits on federal
power, such as the traditional state functions proposition, were
necessary. 22
The Court, however, has found it necessary in some instances to pro-
hibit coercive federal regulation of the states. 123 In New York v. United
States, 24 the Court invalidated a federal regulation because the regula-
tion coerced a state into carrying out a federal regulatory scheme. 25
120. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554. The Court pointed to the states' success in obtaining fed-
eral funding for police and fire services as an example of the states' interests being served
by the political process. Id. at 552-53. The Court also noted the states' ability to secure
exemptions from federal programs as another example of the states exercising their influ-
ence in the political process. Id. at 553. But see John H. Sununu, Evolution and Erosion of
Federal Principles, in Is CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM NECESSARY To REINVIGORATE FED-
ERALISM?: A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 3, 5 (Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental
Relations No. M-154, 1987) (suggesting that the states' ability to obtain federal funding
indicates the abrogation of states' rights).
By leaving the protection of state sovereignty up to the political process, Garcia indi-
rectly reinforces Darby's proposition that the Tenth Amendment is but a truism. See Gar-
cia, 469 U.S. at 574-75 (Powell, J., dissenting).
121. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51. According to the Court, the structure of the federal
government protected the states from Congressional overreaching because the states
played a role in electing the executive and legislative branches of government. Id. at 551.
In addition, the states have influence in the Senate by virtue of the equal representation
guarantee in Article I, § 3 of the Constitution. Id.
122. Id. at 556. The majority noted that no cases required the Court "to identify or
define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action
affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Id.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Garcia, essentially proposed that only ex-
plicitly stated prohibitions serve as limits on substantive grants of power to the federal
government. Vincent Ostrom, Garcia, Constitutional Rule, And The Central-Government
Trap, in FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: A SYMPOSIUM ON Garcia 35,42 (Advisory
Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations No. M-152, 1987). Under the Constitution, such
prohibitions are relatively few and include those against bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws. Id.; see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cf. 3. Justice Blackmun recognized that the substan-
tive grant of power to regulate commerce is without limit when it includes "anything that
affects or is affected by" interstate commerce. See Ostrom, supra, at 42. According to
Justice Blackmun, no affirmative limits are necessary because the structure of the federal
system is sufficient to protect states' rights. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51. Critics of the
"Blackmun doctrine" assert that the structure of federal government is an inadequate pro-
tection because the governmental decision-making process is unrepresentative of the elec-
torate and is subject to change by Congress. Ostrom, supra, at 49.
123. See supra note 117 (noting that the holding in New York v. United States is applica-
ble only to the limited situation in which Congress coerces a state to take action).
124. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
125. Id. at 188.
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New York concerned a federal law regulating disposal of low-level radio-
active waste.126 The Court invalidated the "take title" provision of the
law which offered states a choice of accepting the waste, or regulating its
disposal according to federal standards. 127 The Court found the take title
provision unconstitutional because it coerced the states into complying
with the federal regulation.' 2 8 Thus, even though the Court traditionally
has upheld federal laws that are applicable to the states, the Court drew
the line where Congress compelled a state to enforce a federal regulatory
scheme. 12
9
3. Federal Criminal Legislation
As with civil rights legislation and the regulation of state entities, the
Court has upheld federal criminal legislation based on the commerce
power.'3 ' Federal criminal legislation, however, tends to encroach upon
126. Id. at 149.
127. Id. at 173-76. The Act provided monetary incentives, access incentives, and a take
title provision to encourage states to comply with federal regulations and dispose of waste
within their borders. Id. The "monetary incentives" in the Act permitted states to place a
surcharge on waste received from states without disposal sites. Id. at 152-53. The "access
incentives" in the Act permitted states with waste sites to gradually increase the surcharges
on waste received from states without sites and eventually deny those states access. Id. at
153. Finally, the "take title" provision of the Act required that if a state did not provide for
disposal of its own waste by a specified date, the state would have to take title to the waste
and become liable for all damages suffered by the generator of the waste. Id. at 153-54.
According to the Court, the monetary and access incentives were constitutionally permissi-
ble means for the federal government to induce states to regulate. Id. at 173-74. The
Court found the monetary incentives were constitutionally justified under the commerce
clause and the Spending Clause. Id. at 173. The access incentives were also a constitution-
ally permissible exercise of the commerce power. Id. at 173-74.
128. Id. at 174-76. Although the Court held that Congress was prohibited from using
this type of coercive regulatory technique, the Court did not specifically state why the
provision was invalid. See id. at 177. Instead the Court offered two alternatives as to why
the provision was invalid: "Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside
Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved
by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our
Government established by the Constitution." Id.; cf Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (observing with regard to a federal min-
ing statute that "there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regula-
tory program.").
129. But see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995)
(criticizing the majority opinion of New York v. United States and offering justifications for
coercing a state).
130. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (upholding the Consumer
Credit Protection Act as within the federal commerce power).
1996] Reaffirming the Federal Commerce Power 1483
the state's traditional autonomy in regulating local crime.' Thus, the
Court has always demanded a clear statement of Congress's intent to al-
ter the federal-state balance before it would uphold a statute expanding
federal criminal jurisdiction.132
Nevertheless, in Perez v. United States,133 the Court expanded federal
criminal jurisdiction to reach intrastate loansharking.13 4 Perez involved a
man convicted under the Consumer Credit Protection Act who chal-
lenged the Act's constitutionality. 135 The Court upheld the Act as a valid
exercise of the commerce power, reasoning that Congress can regulate a
class of activities as long as that class has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 36 Thus, Congress may regulate a class of intrastate activities
without a particular demonstration of the intrastate activity's effect on
commerce. 37 Relying on the legislative history of the Act, the Court
found that intrastate loansharking was a class of activities that Congress
131. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (holding that states possess
authority for defining and enforcing criminal law); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
109 (1945) (supporting the proposition that states should administer criminal justice).
132. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 450 (1953) (plurality opin-
ion) ("[W]e must assume that the implications and limitations of our federal system consti-
tute a major premise of all congressional legislation .... "); FrC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312
U.S. 349, 355 (1941) (requiring a clear manifestation of Congress's intention before the
Court will construe a statute broadly); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513
(1940) ("An intention to disturb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to Congress.").
Through narrow statutory interpretation, the Court has rejected the government's efforts
to use ambiguous federal statutes to regulate areas such as local crime. See, e.g., United
States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973) (interpreting the language in the Hobbs Act
narrowly); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (interpreting language in the
Travel Act narrowly); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 351 (1971) (interpreting the
language of § 1202(a)(1) of the Omnibus Crime Control Act narrowly); Five Gambling
Devices, 346 U.S. at 450 (plurality opinion) (interpreting the language of the Gambling
Devices Act narrowly).
133. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
134. Id. at 156-57.
135. Id. at 149.
136. Id. at 154; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (regulating, as a
class of activities, the employment of workers producing goods for interstate commerce).
In Darby, the Court declared that, "In passing on the validity of legislation of the class...
the only function of courts is to determine whether the particular activity regulated or
prohibited is within the reach of the federal power." Id. at 120-21; see also Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,252-53 (1964) (validating Congress's use of
the federal commerce power to regulate, as another class of activities, the provision of
public accommodations for transient guests); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05
(1964) (upholding Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it regulated a class of activi-
ties affecting interstate commerce-serving interstate travellers or serving food that has
moved in interstate commerce).
137. Perez, 402 U.S. at 156.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1459
could regulate because it affected interstate commerce by financing or-
ganized crime, and by causing the takeover of legitimate businesses. 138
In other instances, the Court has been less willing to expand the com-
merce power to validate federal criminal legislation. 139 In United States v.
Bass, '4 the Court interpreted a statute narrowly to avoid addressing po-
tential constitutional issues.141 Bass concerned a defendant convicted
under a federal statute imposing criminal sanctions on any felon who re-
ceived, possessed, or transported a firearm in commerce. 42 The Court
explained that the statute was not clear as to whether the words "in com-
merce or affecting commerce" applied exclusively to the transportation of
the firearm, or whether the words also applied to the receiving and pos-
sessing of the firearm. 43 By interpreting the statute narrowly, the Court
avoided the constitutional question of whether Congress could regulate
the possession of firearms without showing how possession related to in-
terstate commerce.'" The Court noted that the statute was ambiguous
138. Id. at 156-57.
139. See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) (plurality opin-
ion). In Five Gambling Devices, the Court narrowly interpreted a federal statute that pro-
hibited the shipment of gambling machines in interstate commerce. Id. at 452. The statute
contained reporting requirements that applied to every manufacturer and dealer of gam-
bling devices. Id. at 443. However, the reporting requirements in the statute applied to all
manufacturers and dealers, not just to those who were connected with interstate com-
merce. Id. at 444. According to the Court, this lack of a nexus between interstate com-
merce and the person required to report raised doubts about the constitutionality of the
legislation. See id. at 446. Conceivably, under this statute, a manufacturer or dealer could
be required to report information even though the person had no connection with inter-
state commerce. See id. at 444.
The Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal on statutory grounds, thereby avoiding
the constitutional problems of the statute. Id. at 452. The Court referred to previous hold-
ings to defend its position: "The principle is old and deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence
that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that requires decision of serious consti-
tutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative." Id. at
448. The dissent asserted that the statutory language was clear and left no reasonable
alternative but to address the constitutional issues. Id. at 454 (Clark, J., dissenting).
140. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
141. Id. at 351; see also United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973) (narrowly
interpreting a federal statute to avoid constitutional issues); Rewis v. United States, 401
U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (same). But see Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577
(1977) (interpreting the federal firearms statute involved in Bass broadly once the govern-
ment had demonstrated a minimal connection between possession and interstate com-
merce).
142. Bass, 404 U.S. at 337. The statute provided criminal sanctions for felons "who
receiv[ed], possess[ed], or transport[ed] in commerce or affecting a commerce ...any
firearm." 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1994).
143. Bass, 404 U.S. at 347.
144. Id. at 347-48. The Court recognized the ambiguous construction of the statute and
decided to "adopt the narrower reading: the phrase 'in commerce or affecting commerce' is
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and demanded that Congress convey its purpose clearly where the statute
involves shifting the federal-state balance. 145
II. FINDING THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES Acr BEYOND THE
LIMITS: UNITED STATES V. LOPEz
In United States v. Lopez,146 the Respondent, Lopez, was charged with
violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act, a federal statute making it un-
lawful to knowingly possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school
zone.'47 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas upheld the Act and found that guns near schools affected the busi-
part of all three offenses, and the present conviction must be set aside because the Govern-
ment has failed to show the requisite nexus with interstate commerce." Id. at 347.
145. Id. at 347-49. The Court maintained "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly,
[the statute] will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance."
Id. at 349.
146. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); see supra note 15 and accompanying text (recounting the
facts of Lopez).
147. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626; 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992),
amended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1)(A)-(2)(A) (1994)). Originally, the statute contained no reference or findings
as to how guns in school zones affected commerce. See supra note 15 (providing the text of
the original statute). However, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Lopez
case, Congress added the following language to the statute:
(q)(1) The Congress finds and declares that-
(A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, na-
tionwide problem;
(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of
drugs, guns, and criminal gangs;
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and
have been found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as docu-
mented in numerous hearings...
(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts,
ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made have consid-
erably moved in interstate commerce;
(E) while criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens and
foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the coun-
try due to concern about violent crime and gun violence, and parents may
decline to send their children to school for the same reason;
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a de-
cline in the quality of education in our country;
(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on in-
terstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States;
(H) States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to han-
dle gun-related crime by themselves; even States, localities, and school sys-
tems that have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-
related crime find their efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or in-
ability of other States or localities to take strong measures; and
(I) Congress has power, under the interstate commerce clause and other
provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integrity
and safety of the Nation's schools by enactment of this subsection.
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ness of education, which in turn affected commerce.' 48 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Act, finding no
rational basis for a connection between guns in school zones and inter-
state commerce. 149 The government appealed to the Supreme Court
which affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding in a five to four decision.1 50
A. The Majority Opinion: Distinguishing Commercial and
Noncommercial Activities
After reviewing the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court determined
that it was not a valid exercise of the federal commerce power. 15 1 The
Court identified the three general categories in which Congress histori-
cally has been permitted to exercise its commerce power: (1) regulation
of the use of the channels of interstate commerce,152 (2) regulation of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce,' 53 and (3) regulation of activi-
ties having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' 54 According to
(2)(A) It shall be unlawful for any individual to knowingly possess a firearm
at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
2125 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)-(2)(A) (1994)).
Although Congress amended the statute to include findings linking guns in school zones
to interstate commerce, the government did not rely on these findings "as a substitute for
findings in the first instance." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4. Yet, the government did argue
that these findings "'indicate that reasons can be identified for why Congress wanted to
regulate this particular activity."' Id. (quoting the transcript of oral argument).
The appellate court judge noted the statute as written originally:
makes it a federal offense to carry an unloaded firearm in an unlocked suitcase on
a public sidewalk in front of one's residence, so long as that part of the sidewalk is
within one thousand feet-two or three city blocks-of the boundary of the
grounds of any public or private school anywhere in the United States, regardless
of whether it is during the school year or the school is in session.
United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1346 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
148. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
149. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366-68.
150. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
151. Id. at 1630-34.
152. Id. (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)).
153. Id. at 1629; see also The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (discussing
the instrumentalities rationale).
154. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30; see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (discussing the substantial effects test); Charles Fried, Forward: Revolu-
tions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 40 (1995) (proposing that this third category of regulation
involves economic conceptualization more so than the other two categories).
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the Court, in order to be sustained, this statute had to fall under the third
category, as it did not qualify under the first or second.155
The Court admitted that the case law has been unclear regarding
whether an activity must merely "affect" or "substantially affect" com-
merce. 15 6 After reviewing the history of the commerce clause, the Court
concluded that prior case law dictated that an activity must substantially
affect commerce. 157 In addition, the majority recognized that the Court
always has placed limits on the commerce power. 158 Because this Act
extended beyond those limits, the majority refused to sustain it.159 First,
the Court noted that section 922(q), which prohibited possession of a fire-
arm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, was not a regulation of commer-
cial activity. 160 Thus, the Act could not be upheld under prior case law
155. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Court determined that § 922(q) did not fall into
either of the first two categories because it did not attempt to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce nor did it attempt to protect an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce. Id.
156. Id. Compare Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (stating that the Court must
defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce as
long as there is any rational basis for the finding) with Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196
n.27 (1968) (stating that Congress may not use a trivial impact on commerce to justify a
general regulation unless the activity bears a "substantial relation" to commerce).
157. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630; see, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 280 (1981) (finding that intrastate coal mining has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (finding
that intrastate loansharking has a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (finding that restaurants serving large amounts of food
that have moved in interstate commerce have a substantial effect on interstate commerce);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (finding that the
operation of a motel serving interstate travellers has a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (finding that production and con-
sumption of home-grown wheat, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce).
Concurring in Hodel, Chief Justice Burger indicated his support for the "substantially
affects" test: "we often seem to forget the doctrine that laws enacted by Congress under
the Commerce Clause must be based on a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Ho-
del, 452 U.S. at 305 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
158. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29. The Court referred to its warning in Jones & Laugh-
lin that extending the commerce clause to activities having an indirect and remote effect on
interstate commerce would create a completely centralized government. Id. The Court
also cited its decision in Maryland v. Wirtz which similarly recognized that Congress can-
not use a trivial impact on commerce as a justification for regulating state activities. Id. at
1629 (citing Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27).
159. Id. at 1630-34; see also discussion infra note 222 and accompanying text (observing
the majority's determination in Lopez that the Gun-Free School Zones Act went beyond
the scope of the commerce power).
160. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. The Court distinguished between commercial and non-
commercial activity. Id. at 1630-31. The channels of interstate commerce, the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce, and commercial activities that have a substantial effect on
commerce are within the reach of the federal commerce power. Id. at 1629-30. For the
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that permitted federal regulation of intrastate commercial activities sub-
stantially affecting interstate commerce.' 61
Second, the Court recognized that the Act lacked a jurisdictional ele-
ment.162 The Act simply banned gun possession within 1,000 feet of a
school zone generally, omitting a requirement that a nexus exist between
the possession and interstate commerce. 163 According to the majority, a
jurisdictional element would have allowed a case-by-case inquiry to de-
termine whether each particular firearm possession in a school zone actu-
ally affected interstate commerce. 164 Because possession of a firearm did
not have an obvious connection with commercial activity, a jurisdictional
element would have validated the Act by limiting its reach to only those
firearm possessions with the requisite interstate nexus. 1 65 The majority
noted that, in this case, making a determination about the requisite inter-
federal government to regulate noncommercial activity under the commerce power, the
Court seemed to indicate that the noncommercial activity had to have some connection
with commerce or an economic enterprise. Id. at 1630-31.
161. Id. at 1631. The majority commented, "The possession of a gun in a local school
zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substan-
tially affect interstate commerce." Id. at 1634; cf Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29
(1942) (holding that home-grown and home-consumed wheat, in the aggregate, substan-
tially affects the interstate wheat market). The Court noted that Wickard involved the
wheat market, an economic enterprise, whereas Lopez involved gun possession, which is in
no sense an economic activity or enterprise. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
162. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. An appropriate jurisdictional element would have re-
quired a showing that each case of gun possession was in some way connected with or
affected interstate commerce. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337 (1971) (involv-
ing a statute that contained a jurisdictional element). The statute in Bass, for instance,
contained a jurisdictional element requiring a showing that the possession, receipt, or
transportation of a firearm was in or affecting commerce. Id. The Court in Bass refused to
address the constitutional issue of whether this jurisdictional element was sufficient to jus-
tify using the commerce power because the statute was constructed ambiguously. Id. at
346-47; see supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of
the statute in Bass).
163. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1631-32; see Kelly G. Black, Note, Removing Intrastate Lawsuits:
The Affecting-Commerce Argument After United States v. Lopez, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1103, 1130 (describing jurisdictional elements and noting that such jurisdictional elements
require the government to prove specified facts illustrating authority over the persons or
subject matter involved in the proceeding). A jurisdictional element would ensure that a
statute regulating a class of activities only regulated those instances in which the activity
possessed the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. Black, supra, at 1130.
164. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. Nothing in the record indicated that Alfonso Lopez, a
local student attending a local school, had recently moved in interstate commerce nor had
any ties with interstate commerce. Id. at 1634. Nothing in the statute, moreover, required
such a showing. Id.
165. Id. at 1631. The Court refused to rely on previous congressional findings to justify
the statute because earlier findings would not address the specific subject matter of
§ 922(q). Id. at 1632.
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state nexus was not possible because the Act lacked any legislative
findings."6
Thus, the Court rejected the government's general argument that pos-
session of guns in school zones substantially affects interstate com-
merce. 16 7 The government made two assertions regarding the effect that
guns in school zones had on commerce: the "costs of crime" rationale 168
and the "national productivity" rationale. 69 Under a "costs of crime"
rationale, the federal government could regulate virtually all activities no
matter how remote their effect on interstate commerce. 17  Under the
"national productivity" rationale, Congress's reach would extend to the
economic productivity of individual citizens.' 71 The majority, however,
refused to accept either justification, noting that the connection between
gun possession in a school zone and interstate commerce was too tenu-
ous.' 72 The majority reasoned that accepting either rationale would
transform the commerce clause into a general federal police power.173
166. Id. at 1631-32. Legislative findings on how possession of a firearm in a school zone
affects interstate commerce could have been used in assessing the constitutionality of the
statute. Id. Indeed, Congress is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial
burdens an activity has on interstate commerce, however, in the absence of any such find-
ings, the majority could not conduct a rational basis review. Id.
167. Id. at 1630-32.
168. Id. at 1632. Under this line of reasoning, the government maintained that the sub-
stantial costs of violent crime are spread throughout the country by the mechanism of
insurance. Id. The government also posited that the substantial costs of violent crime
reduce interstate travel in those areas perceived to be dangerous. Id.
169. Id. Under this line of reasoning, the government claimed that the presence of guns
threatens education which produces a "less productive citizenry," ultimately damaging the
nation's economy. Id.
170. Id. at 1632.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1632-34. The majority remarked, "To uphold the Government's contentions
here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
the sort retained by the States." Id. at 1634.
173. Id. at 1634. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1 (commenting on the
federal government's lack of a general police power).
The majority also addressed several points that Justice Breyer made in his dissent. Lo-
pez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33. First, the majority highlighted Justice Breyer's failure to present
any examples of an activity that would be beyond the federal government's reach if these
theories were accepted. Id. The majority asserted that Justice Breyer's rationale would
permit the federal government to regulate family law (i.e., marriage, divorce, and child
custody) and education. Id. at 1632. Furthermore, the majority speculated that if the fed-
eral government could regulate activities that affect the learning environment then, in a
logical progression, the government also could regulate the educational process directly.
Id. at 1633. In addition, the majority acknowledged Justice Breyer's criticism that drawing
a line between commercial and noncommercial activities creates legal uncertainty. Id. at
1633. The majority conceded that this distinction would create legal uncertainty; however,
the majority also insisted that this legal uncertainty always will exist under the Constitu-
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B. The Concurrences: Concerns With Maintaining the Federal Balance
and the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause
1. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote separately to em-
phasize why the Court, in light of sixty years of expansive commerce
clause jurisprudence, refused to uphold this exercise of the government's
commerce power. 174 Justice Kennedy remarked that this limited holding
was necessary because the Act upset the federal balance to such a degree
that it was an invalid exercise of the federal commerce power. 175 After
tracing the evolution of the commerce clause, Justice Kennedy accepted
the majority's distinction between commercial and noncommercial activi-
ties. 176 He also recognized that the Court and the legal system have a
substantial interest in the stability of commerce clause jurisprudence,177
but he maintained that this interest in stability does not foreclose the
Court from reviewing congressional action in those cases where the ac-
tion alters the federal-state balance. 78
Although the Court's role in preserving the federal balance is attenu-
ated,179 Justice Kennedy insisted that the Court is compelled to intervene
tion's system of enumerated powers. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 254-57 (explor-
ing this uncertainty as an inevitable consequence of the federal system). The majority
explained that the Constitution enumerates the powers of the federal government. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1633. Because those powers are subject to "judicially enforceable outer lim-
its," uncertainty arises as to how far those enumerated powers reach. Id.
174. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 1640.
176. Id. at 1634-37. Justice Kennedy's survey revealed that the various interpretations
of the commerce power are attributable to the "transition from the economic system the
Founders knew to the single, national market still emergent in our own era .... " Id. at
1634. Justice Kennedy accepted the commercial/noncommercial distinction because "Con-
gress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single mar-
ket and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy." Id. at 1637.
177. Id. Justice Kennedy also noted that imposing content-based boundaries (i.e., dis-
tinguishing between manufacture and commerce) produced inconsistent results in defining
the commerce clause. Id. 1635-37. See generally cases cited supra notes 8, 47, & 65 (articu-
lating the manufacture/commerce distinction). But see Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional
Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 189-91 (1995) (advocating
"roll[ing] back the carpet to the original 1787 position" because no reliance interest justi-
fies the concept of stare decisis in commerce jurisprudence).
178. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Fried, supra note 154, at 43
(suggesting Justice Kennedy's "implicit structural sense of the federal-state balance" as the
most interesting direction for development in the post-Lopez era).
179. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy cited
structural elements of the Constitution: separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial
review, and federalism. Id. Justice Kennedy characterized the Court's role in preserving
separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review as well settled. Id. at 1637;
see, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983) (discussing the concept of checks and
balances); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952) (Frank-
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in those cases where the federal government's regulation diminishes
political accountability' 80 and where the regulation interferes with tradi-
tional state concerns.' 8 ' Justice Kennedy remarked that federal regula-
tion of noncommercial intrastate activities, traditionally a state concern,
creates uncertainty regarding political accountability.'" When the fed-
eral government begins to encroach upon areas of traditional state con-
cern, the electorate is unsure of which level of government to hold
accountable.'8 3
Justice Kennedy also noted that in addition to reducing political ac-
countability, federal intrusion into areas of traditional state concern pre-
vents states from experimenting with various solutions to their internal
problems.'84 Such experimentation permits a state to fashion its own reg-
ulations and sanctions. 185 According to Justice Kennedy, gun possession
in a school zone lacked the essential nexus to commercial activity neces-
sary to invoke the federal commerce power;8 6 thus, the Act disrupted
the federal balance and the Court was compelled to intervene. 8
7
2. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
In a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas chronicled the Court's dra-
matic deviation from the original meaning of the commerce clause to
emphasize the necessity of fashioning a more coherent and limited inter-
furter, J., concurring) (noting the doctrine of separation of powers); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803) (discussing the process of judicial review). Justice Ken-
nedy maintained that although tenuous, the Court also has played a role in maintaining the
federal balance. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Under several judi-
cial doctrines, the Court has intervened to maintain the federal and state balance. Id.; see,
e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516-24 (1992) (addressing issues of
preemption); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492-93 (1991) (involving a claim of habeas
corpus); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983) (addressing adequate and in-
dependent state grounds); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (applying the doctrine
of abstention); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (involving primacy of state
laws concerns).
180. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 1640.
182. Id. at 1638. Justice Kennedy maintained that noncommercial intrastate activities
traditionally are left to the states, and federal intrusion into this realm of state authority
would cause political responsibility to become illusory. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1641.
185. Id. Justice Kennedy asserted that education is clearly a traditional concern of the
state. Id. at 1640. Therefore, because of the state's "claim [to control education] by right
of history and expertise," the state is the appropriate level of government to regulate the
safety of schools. Id. at 1641.
186. Id at 1642.
187. Id.
1492 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1459
pretation of the clause.188 Focusing on the Founding Fathers' view that
activities such as agriculture and manufacture were separate from com-
merce and that commerce included sale and transport but not business in
general,189 Justice Thomas submitted that "commerce" demands a more
narrow definition. 9 ° Accordingly, he maintained that the Founders did
not intend that the commerce power reach every activity substantially af-
fecting commerce because that interpretation would render the rest of
the enumerated powers superfluous. 191
To support his originalist interpretation of the Constitution, Justice
Thomas criticized Justice Breyer's reading of Gibbons v. Ogden.' 92 First,
Justice Thomas asserted that the dissent's notion of the federal govern-
ment regulating any activity affecting commerce was incorrect. 193
Rather, he noted that the inclusion of the "affects" language in Gibbons
was intended only to clarify the intrastate/interstate distinction. 94 He as-
serted that this language merely explained that an activity must affect
commerce to be included under the commerce power-not that every ac-
tivity that affects commerce could be regulated. 195  Second, Justice
Thomas argued that Gibbons did not purport to give the federal govern-
ment control over matters Congress deemed national.196 Justice Thomas,
instead, read Gibbons as a refusal to allow Congress to regulate the states
generally. 197
Justice Thomas also highlighted the deficiencies in the substantially af-
fects test espoused in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion. 98 Insisting that
188. Id. at 1642-43 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas proposed that the substan-
tially affects test should be reconsidered in future cases. Id.
189. Id. at 1643. Justice Thomas noted that during the time of ratification, commerce
consisted of selling, buying, bartering, and transporting, rather than production or manu-
facturing. Id.; see supra note 2 (detailing the various contexts in which the word commerce
was used synonymously with the term trade).
190. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 1644. Justice Thomas noted that under the substantially affects test, other
enumerated powers over activities such as enacting bankruptcy laws, standardizing weights
and measures, establishing post offices, and granting patents and copyrights would be "sur-
plusage." Id. He also claimed that if a substantially affects rationale can be attached to the
commerce power then it also could be attached to every other enumerated power. Id.
192. Id. at 1646 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
193. Id. at 1647.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1648; see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) (commenting on "national" crime). Like Justice Thomas, Justice Stewart main-
tained that labeling an intrastate activity, specifically crime, as a "national" problem was
not enough to justify invocation of the federal commerce power. Id. at 157. According to
Justice Stewart, "all crime is a national problem." Id.
197. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1648 (Thomas, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 1649.
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the substantially affects test grants the federal government a police
power, Justice Thomas explained that such a grant would give Congress
unlimited authority to regulate any activity.' 99 Once again, he asserted
that this flaw in the substantial effects test demonstrated how far current
commerce clause jurisprudence has deviated from the Founders' original
intentions, and he maintained that, in light of this deviation, the major-
ity's decision is not as "radical" as the dissent suggested.2 °°
C. The Dissenters: Insisting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act Passes
the Rational Basis Test
Justices Breyer, Stevens,2° ' Souter,2°2 and Ginsburg dissented and
199. Id. at 1649-50. Justice Thomas specifically cited the aggregate theory espoused in
Wickard to demonstrate that the substantial effects test "has no stopping point." Id.
200. Id.
201. Justice Stevens joined Justice Breyer's dissent but also submitted his own brief
dissent. Id. at 1651, 1657. In his own dissent, Justice Stevens commented on Congress's
power to regulate firearms. Id. at 1651. According to Justice Stevens, firearm possession is
a consequence of commercial activity. Id. He maintained further that guns are articles of
commerce and may restrain commerce; therefore, Congress, through the commerce clause,
has the authority to regulate firearms possession at any location. Id.
202. In addition to joining Justice Breyer's dissent, Justice Souter submitted his own
dissent emphasizing judicial restraint. Id. at 1651, 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter attacked assertions in both the majority's opinion and in Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence. Id. at 1653-57. Regarding the majority's commercial/noncommercial distinction,
Justice Souter warned that this classification resembles the defunct direct/indirect test. Id.
at 1653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to Justice Souter, qualifying the rational ba-
sis test with classifications such as direct/indirect and commercial/noncommercial is un-
workable. Id. at 1654. In order to refute the majority's claim that the connection between
gun possession and commerce is remote, Justice Souter pointed out the implications of an
illiterate nation on commerce. Id. He recognized that perhaps the federal government
should not be involved in education, but an uneducated populous certainly has an effect on
commerce. Id. In response to Justice Kennedy's focus on traditional state concerns, Jus-
tice Souter reminded his fellow Justices that "the notion that the commerce power dimin-
ishes the closer it gets to customary state concerns" was renounced recently. Id.; see
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (discarding the traditional
governmental functions rationale); supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (discussing
the Garcia decision).
Justice Souter also addressed the majority's concern about the lack of congressional find-
ings. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1655-57. According to Justice Souter, requiring the legislature to
make specific findings implies judicial authority to review the wisdom of congressional
decisions. Id. Instead, Justice Souter maintained that the well-settled commerce clause
jurisprudence of the past sixty years only requires the Court to determine whether Con-
gress acted "within the realm of reason." Id. at 1656. Finally, Justice Souter insisted that
this holding should be viewed as a "misstep" from traditional interpretation. Id. at 1657.
However, Justice Souter also offered a caveat: "Not every epochal case has come in ep-
ochal trappings." Id. In other words, although the decision in this case was only a misstep,
it has the potential to alter a well-settled area of the law. But see Joan Biskupic, Justices
Shift Federal-State Power Balance: Rehnquist-Led Majority Determined to Restrict Washing-
ton's Authority, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al, A6 (quoting University of California,
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found that the Act passed the rational basis test."°3 Justice Breyer re-
counted the three basic principles of commerce clause interpretation.
First, an activity must have a significant effect on commerce. °4 Second,
when a local activity standing alone does not have a significant effect on
commerce, Congress still may regulate the activity if it has an effect on
commerce in the aggregate.2 0 5 Third, the Court is required to afford
Congress a high degree of deference by using a rational basis level of
review. 206
Applying the rational basis test, Justice Breyer concluded that the Act
clearly satisfied rational basis review.20 7 He reasoned that guns in schools
undermine the quality of education and ultimately produce uneducated
workers.20 8 As a result, this uneducated workforce deprives communities
and businesses of the ability to compete successfully in interstate com-
merce. 09 Justice Breyer proposed that upholding the Act would not im-
ply an expansion of the commerce power; instead, "it simply would apply
preexisting law to changing economic circumstances.
' 2 10
Berkeley's Professor Jesse H. Choper). Professor Choper commented, "Is the [C]ourt go-
ing back to the [early] New Deal era and beginning to strike down gobs of federal legisla-
tion ... ? No. But is this a major qualification in the attitude since the New Deal? Yes."
Id. (emphasis added).
203. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204. Id. Justice Breyer noted that he chose the word "significantly" over "substan-
tially" because the latter implies a narrower definition than recent precedent. Id.
205. Id. at 1658; see supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (explaining the aggregate
effects rationale adopted in Wickard); cf. supra note 161 (noting Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion distinguishing the noncommercial activity in Lopez from the commercial activity
in Wickard).
206. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer asserted the em-
pirical judgment of whether a regulated activity affects interstate commerce is better left to
the legislature than the courts. Id. He noted, "[T]he Constitution requires us to judge the
connection between regulated activity and interstate commerce, not directly, but at one
remove." Id. But cf Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (recognizing the Court's duty to consider
legislative findings).
207. Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1659-61.
209. Id. Justice Breyer cited increasing competition in the global economy to illustrate
the importance of education as related to business. Id. at 1660. Attributing the decline in
worker productivity to inadequate education, Justice Breyer maintained that Congress
could have concluded that uneducated workers may jeopardize the country's "standing in
the international marketplace." Id. Further illustrating the interconnectedness of educa-
tion and business, Justice Breyer noted that businesses today are involved in structuring
the agenda of our nation's classrooms. Id. at 1661.
210. Id. at 1662. Gun-related violence, especially near schools, has a definite impact on
the nation's economy, and the Court always has permitted Congress to regulate according
to these "economic ... realities" and "national needs." Id. at 1662-63 (quoting North Am.
Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946)).
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Justice Breyer also criticized the legal problems implicated in the ma-
jority's determination that the statute was not supported by the com-
merce clause. 211  First, Justice Breyer argued that the decision was
inconsistent with several cases that approved Congress's exercise of the
commerce power where the interstate nexus was less significant than the
impact of guns and school violence on commerce.212 Second, Justice
Breyer argued that the decision incorrectly distinguished between com-
mercial and noncommercial activity, thereby ignoring previous warnings
of the Court.213 In Perez, McClung, and Wickard, the Court did not base
its holding on the economic nature of the activity involved, but on the
effect the activity had on interstate commerce.21 4 According to Justice
Breyer, history has proven that focusing on the economic nature of an
activity is unworkable.215 Finally, Justice Breyer contended that the deci-
sion created legal uncertainty,216 in that, before this decision, Congress
could confidently enact federal criminal laws under the commerce
power.217 This uncertainty, Justice Breyer argued, would effectively
thwart federal criminal legislation, thereby undermining the nation's eco-
nomic and social well-being.218
III. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ AN EPOCHAL DECISION?
A. Respecting the Present State of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
For the Court to invalidate the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the major-
ity did not drastically alter commerce clause jurisprudence; in fact, the
majority accepted the general categories of commerce regulation21 9 and
affirmed the rational basis level of review. 220 The majority accurately
211. Id. at 1662-65.
212. Id. at 1662-63 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
213. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
214. Id. According to Justice Breyer, in Perez the activity was use of force (in credit
transactions) and in McClung, the activity was race based exclusion-neither activity being
commercial in nature. Id.
215. Id. at 1664. Justice Breyer commented that such a distinction would be nearly
impossible to make. Id. Teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic skills, for instance,
serves social as well as commercial purposes. Id.
216. Id. at 1664-65.
217. Id. at 1664.
218. Id. at 1665.
219. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31; see Epstein, supra note 177, at 174 (maintaining that
Chief Justice Rehnquist carefully surveyed the history of commerce jurisprudence to coin-
cide with his opinion in Lopez).
220. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629; cf Epstein, supra note 177, at 177 (proposing that Lopez
marks a shift to intermediate scrutiny). According to Professor Epstein, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's choice of the phrase "we ... consider" legislative findings indicates that the
Court is not "bound" by the findings. Id. (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631).
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pointed out that each decision expanding the scope of the commerce
clause recognized that the commerce power is limited.221 As such, the
Lopez decision is not a deviation from the Court's prior holdings but
rather an invalidation of a statute that simply exceeded those limits.222
Although the Court has never required Congress to make formal find-
ings,"' the Court has always demanded a clear statement of Congress's
intentions, especially in those cases where the application of the com-
merce power was tenuous. 224 In the Gun-Free School Zones Act, how-
ever, Congress neglected to articulate any statement linking the
possession of guns in school zones with interstate commerce; in fact, the
Act did not even contain the word commerce, making it impossible for
the Court to determine whether Congress had a rational basis for enact-
ing the law.225
221. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29; see, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303(1964) (stating that "[o]f course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activ-
ity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this
Court."); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968) (recognizing that "[n]either here
nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on
commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities."); see
also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 313 (2d ed. 1988) (maintain-
ing that the commerce power is also subject to limits such as the Bill of Rights).
222. See Jay M. Cohen & David J. Fried, United States v. Lopez and the Federalization
of Criminal Law, 29 PROSECUTOR 23 (1995) (concluding that the Court's decision in Lopez
represents merely an example of a federal law that went beyond the limits of the commerce
power); Fried, supra note 154, at 37 (maintaining that "the Court both adhered to and
refreshed tradition" in the Lopez decision); cf. Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United
States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 Duo. L. REV. 1, 34 (1995) (charac-
terizing the Court's decision in Lopez as a refusal to proceed any further with the expan-
sion of the commerce clause, rather than a limit on the commerce clause).
223. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964) (noting that "no formal find-
ings were made, which of course are not necessary"); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (stating that explicit findings are not required). See generally
Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 105 (1966) (asserting that, although courts may rely on the
congressional record, legislative findings are not essential to the constitutionality of a fed-
eral statute); Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: The Illusion of Certainty, 46 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1723, 1729-40 (1995) (examining the justifications and legitimacy of the judiciary
imposing empirical data requirements on Congress); David S. Gehrig, Note The Gun-Free
School Zones Act: The Shootout Over Legislative Findings, the Commerce Clause, and Fed-
eralism 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179, 187 (1994) (claiming that preliminary findings are
not a necessary prerequisite to federal legislation).
224. TRIBE, supra note 221, at 316; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991)
(requiring Congress to state clearly its intentions especially in statutes that propose to alter
the federal-state balance); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (asserting that
"unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal-state balance").
225. Gun Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp IV 1992),
amended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1)(A)-(2)(A)(1994)). During the congressional hearing on the Gun Free School
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By requiring Congress to state its intentions clearly, whether those in-
tentions are revealed during congressional debate or stated specifically
within the statute, the Court honors its duty as a check on Congress.226
This requirement ensures a greater degree of political accountability.227
Under this clear statement requirement, the federal government, which
must balance competing interests, cannot escape political accountability
by constructing an ambiguous statute.228
The Court's refusal to grant the federal government a general police
power also is well-established.229 The majority in Lopez once again as-
serted that the federal government cannot encroach upon areas where
the states historically have been sovereign.230 The majority noted that if
the Court adopted the government's argument, Congress could regulate
virtually all activities. 231
As the majority recognized, upholding the Act would imply that Con-
gress could regulate almost all noncommercial individual activity, regard-
less of the tenuous connection with interstate commerce.232 A boundless
Zones Act, even a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms official recognized that "the
source of constitutional authority to enact the legislation is not manifest on the face of the
bill." The Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 3757 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990)
(statement of Richard Cook, Chief of the Firearms Division).
226. See TRIBE, supra note 221, at 317; see also David S. Bogen, The Hunting of the
Shark: An Inquiry Into the Limits of Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 187, 198 (1972) ("[T]he Court should require Congress to relate the
law to its impact on interstate transactions. This could assist in focusing Congressional
concern on the proper issues.").
227. See TRIBE, supra note 221, at 317.
228. See id.
229. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (recognizing that the
police power is within the province of the state). The majority in E.C. Knight stated:
It cannot be denied that the power of a State to protect the lives, health, and
property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals.... is a
power originally and always belonging to the States, not surrendered by them to
the general government, nor directly restrained by the Constitution of the United
States, and essentially exclusive.
Id.; see also Hoke and Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 312 (1913) (sustaining
the Mann Act, a morality law prohibiting the transportation of women for the purpose of
prostitution); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 60 (1911) (upholding the
federal Pure Food and Drug Act); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (sustaining
a federal statute which prohibited the sale and circulation of lottery tickets).
230. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995).
231. Id. The majority pointed out that the dissent failed to offer a concrete example of
what activities would be beyond the federal government's reach. Id. The majority also
predicted that the dissent's formulation would permit even regulation of individual activity.
Id.
232. Id.; see United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing
an arson conviction based on a federal statute). In Pappadopoulos, a couple was convicted
of arson under a federal statute criminalizing destruction of any building using or affecting
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1459
federal commerce power would grant Congress control over family law,
including marriage, divorce, and child custody.233 The government could
assert that these aspects of family life have an impact on national produc-
tivity which, in turn, affects commerce.234 Thus, the majority limited the
commerce power to commercial activities having a substantial effect on
commerce.
235
B. Lopez: Confirming Federal Limits and Respecting the Original
Meaning of Commerce
The Court's decision in Lopez also was appropriate because it adhered
to the principle of federalism. 236 The Framers established a federal sys-
tem of government to ensure uniformity in national laws,237 to prevent
overreaching by the federal government, 38 and to protect fundamental
interstate commerce. Id. at 524. Offering evidence that the couple's house received natu-
ral gas from out of state sources, the government charged the couple under the federal
statute. Id. at 525. The couple was convicted, and the wife appealed, asserting the govern-
ment did not have jurisdiction over the private house. Id. The Ninth Circuit overturned
the conviction because the gas pipeline theory was too tenuous a connection with interstate
commerce. Id. at 528; see also Jan C. Greenburg, Lopez Case Ignites Debate on Congress'
Law-Passing Limits, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1996, at 3 (discussing the Pappadopoulos holding).
233. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. In a post-Lopez decision, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to uphold a federal law that
criminalized willful failure to pay child support. United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830,
843 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The court held that Congress had no rational basis for finding that
failure to pay child support substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. Furthermore,
the court noted that family matters such as child support are within the realm of state
sovereignty. Id.; see also United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D. Ariz. 1995)
(refusing to uphold the same federal child support law).
234. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
235. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1403 (proposing it is the nature of the transaction,
rather than the location of the transaction, that determines whether the transaction consti-
tutes interstate commerce); cf. McJohn, supra note 222, at 34 (commenting that the Lopez
decision will not create areas of activity that are absolutely immune to congressional
regulation).
236. See Biskupic, supra note 202, at Al, A16 (discussing the Supreme Court's shift to
protecting states' rights). Chief Justice Rehnquist, accompanied by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, are no longer permitting Congress to exceed its Constitu-
tional powers. Id. Professor Paul D. Gewirtz commented, "What we're seeing from the
judicial branch is an across-the-board restriction on national government power on every
front and a bolstering of state sovereignty." Id. at A16.
237. See supra note I (discussing the reasons why the commerce clause was included in
the Constitution).
238. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison stated, "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are
numerous and indefinite." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 4, at 292 (James Madison).
The Founders were wary of a national government that was too powerful because it might
undermine the States as legitimate political entities. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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liberties.239 Maintenance of this federal balance is imperative in keeping
with the original intentions of the Framers, and, as Justice Kennedy indi-
cated, the Court must assist in preserving that balance.24 ° The expecta-
tion of judicial review encourages Congress to deliberate carefully before
enacting legislation that would alter the federal balance.24 1 The Gun-
Free School Zones Act was Congress's attempt to regulate two areas tra-
ditionally reserved to the states: crime242 and education.243 Thus, the
239. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 572 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
240. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1639 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy explained that the Court's role in maintaining the federal balance is some-
what tenuous in comparison to the Court's significant role in maintaining other structural
elements of the Constitution such as separation of powers, checks and balances, and judi-
cial review. Id. at 1638. Justice Kennedy, however, also remarked that "the federal bal-
ance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in
securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of
Government has tipped the scales too far." Id. at 1639. See generally Henry J. Friendly,
Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977) (recognizing federalism as the unique
contribution that the Framers made to political science).
241. Redish & Drizin, supra note 4, at 49. Professor Redish and Ms. Drizin suggest
that, "The very expectation of review strongly encourages Congress to engage in [a]
searching inquiry .... Such inquiry serves to ensure that Congress stays within the limita-
tions on its power established by the Constitution in the name of federalism." Id.; see also
The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 120-21 (1995)
(asserting that rational basis review after Lopez will compel legislators to consider the
implications on federalism before exercising the commerce power).
242. See cases cited supra note 131 (maintaining the states possess primary authority
over crime).
Not only does the federalization of criminal laws cause problems with the structure of
government, but it also causes severe problems regarding the workload in federal courts.
Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the
Federal Judiciary From the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 503, 505
(1995) (recognizing the impact of federal criminal laws on the federal judiciary and noting
that the criminal caseload in federal courts rose from 27,968 cases in 1980 to 44,919 cases in
1994); Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1247, 1249-50 (1995) (criticizing the increase of federal criminal "knee-jerk" legislation and
comparing the seventy percent increase in criminal filings in federal courts from 1980 to
1992 with the thirty-four percent increase in federal civil filings within the same time
period).
243. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. The majority reasoned:
[I]f Congress can, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that
adversely affect the learning environment, then, a fortiori, it also can regulate the
educational process directly. Congress could determine that a school's curricu-
lum has a 'significant' effect on the extent of classroom learning. As a result,
Congress could mandate a federal curriculum ....
Id.; see also Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88 §§ 101(4),
103(a), 93 Stat. 668, 669-70 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3401(4)) (recognizing that states
possess the primary responsibility for education).
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Act upset the federal-state balance.244 By invalidating the Act, the ma-
jority affirmed the Court's role in maintaining this federal balance.245
The majority's decision is appropriate not only because it conforms
with modem commerce jurisprudence and the ideal of federalism, but
also because it is consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's original inter-
pretation of commerce. 46 Chief Justice Marshall defined commerce as
"intercourse."2 47 During his time, intercourse included shipping, naviga-
tion, and contracts regulating buying and selling.248 Possessing a firearm
in a school zone is not intercourse and would not fit within Chief Justice
Marshall's definition. The economic realities have changed since Gib-
bons,2 49 and the scope of the commerce power has grown considerably so
that the Court cannot possibly return to an original understanding of the
clause. 250  Even Justice Thomas, who rejected the substantial effects
test,251 recognized that in light of the development of the commerce
clause, the Court cannot return commerce jurisprudence to its origins.252
The majority, however, refused to ignore the intended meaning of the
clause and, instead, found a middle ground on which to base its
decision.253
244. See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 3266, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1944 (Dec. 3, 1990). Upon the signing of the Act, President Bush re-
marked, "Most egregiously, section 1702 [922(q)] inappropriately overrides legitimate
State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law. The policies reflected in these
provisions could legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be imposed on
the States by the Congress." Id.
245. The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 241, at 120-21 (re-
marking that the Lopez decision secures the role of federalism in the future of American
government).
246. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's
definition of commerce).
247. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824).
248. Epstein, supra note 2, at 1394.
249. But see id. at 1396 (claiming that no distinction exists between business and its
effects on commerce in our time and at the time of Gibbons).
250. See supra parts I.C and I.D (surveying the expansion of commerce juris-
prudence).
251. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1644 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 1650 n.8. Justice Thomas opined:
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize
that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reex-
amination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance inter-
ests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.
Id.
253. Id. at 1634. Chief Justice Rehnquist declared:
The broad language in [previous] opinions has suggested the possibility of addi-
tional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would
require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated .... This we are unwilling to do.
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C. Finding That Middle Ground
Although the majority's distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial activities may create confusion, this confusion is a necessary re-
sult of the federal system. 254 Congress's power is limited to those grants
of authority enumerated in the Constitution,255 and the extent of those
enumerated powers is subject to considerable debate. 256 The Court, how-
ever, cannot undermine the federal system for the sake of legal
certainty.257
Because Congress exceeded its commerce power authority in enacting
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Lopez majority's invalidation of the
statute was not radical. 258 Rather, the Court was being faithful to prior
Id. (citations omitted).
254. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. The majority recollected:
The [federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated pow-
ers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it ... is now
universally admitted. But the question respecting the extent of the powers actu-
ally granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as
our system shall exist.
Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("[Tlhe question respecting the extent of
[enumerated powers] is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise as long as
our system shall exist."); see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (acknowledging that determining when an activity is appropriately charac-
terized as a traditional state function and beyond Congress's authority under the com-
merce clause can be difficult); Ostrom, supra note 122, at 52 (acknowledging the
overlapping jurisdictions inherent in a federal system).
255. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (enumerating Congress's power); see also Epstein,
supra note 2, at 1395-97 (1987) (commenting on the limited nature of the federal govern-
ment's enumerated powers). Professor Epstein acknowledged that "[a] system which says
that the commerce clause essentially allows the government to regulate anything that even
indirectly burdens or affects commerce does away with the key understanding that the
federal government has received only enumerated powers." Id. at 1396; Gregory W.
O'Reilly & Robert Drizin, United States v. Lopez: Reinvigorating the Federal Balance By
Maintaining the States' Role as the "Immediate and Visible Guardians" of Security, 22 No-
TRE DAME J. LEGIs. 1, 3 (1996) (maintaining that structural mechanisms such as separation
of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review also serve as limits on the federal gov-
ernment's enumerated powers).
256. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; supra note 4 (delineating the limits on the enumerated
federal powers); see also Ostrom, supra note 122, at 40-42 (criticizing Justice Blackmun's
assertion in Garcia that the structure of the federal system adequately protects states'
rights from federal encroachment).
257. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. "The Constitution mandates this uncertainty by with-
holding from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every
type of legislation." Id.; see also JOHN M. MATHEWS, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT 4-5
(1924) (acknowledging that one disadvantage of the federal system of government is the
difficulty inherent in delineating the boundaries between national and state powers).
258. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens characterizes the
majority's holding as "radical." Id.
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case law and the structure of the federal system. 259 Despite inevitable
uncertainty, the majority's formulation of commercial and noncommer-
cial activities is both necessary and workable.260 The distinction permits
federal regulation of the instrumentalities and channels of interstate
commerce.
261
The Court in Lopez indicates a willingness to sustain even federal regu-
lation of noncommercial intrastate activities if the statute contains a juris-
dictional provision allowing a case-by-case inquiry into the activity's
259. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 241, at 119-20
(suggesting that Lopez creates a more independent role for the Court when determining
whether congressional legislation constitutes a valid exercise of the commerce power).
260. See United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1732-33 (1995) (per curiam) (find-
ing a gold mine owner engaged in interstate commerce). Robertson, decided five days
after Lopez, demonstrates that the Lopez distinction still permits necessary regulation of
certain crimes. Id. In Robertson, a drug dealer used proceeds from narcotics sales to open
a gold mine in Alaska and was convicted under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 1732. The Supreme Court found that the mine
operator engaged in interstate commerce because he hired miners from outside Alaska,
purchased equipment in California and shipped it to Alaska, and took gold from the mine
out of Alaska. Id. at 1732-33; see Harvey Berkman, Second Commerce Clause Ruling
Calms the Waters: The School Gun Zone Case, Observers Say, May Indeed Have Been An
Aberration, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at A7 (stating that the Robertson decision should
allay fears that Lopez will make it impossible for the federal government to enact many
criminal laws).
Several other post-Lopez cases have upheld federal criminal laws based on the com-
merce clause. See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act because reproductive health services is an
economic activity substantially affecting interstate commerce); United States v. Garcia-
Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568, 572 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding the Drug-Free School Zones Act
of 1990 because intrastate and interstate drug trafficking substantially affects interstate
commerce); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1520-22 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding a
conviction under a federal law prohibiting the possession and transfer of automatic weap-
ons because automatic weapons are objects of interstate commerce).
261. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (stating that Congress may regulate the use of chan-
nels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce). The Lopez majority only briefly ac-
knowledged the instrumentalities and channels of commerce rationale, rather the majority
focused on the substantially affecting commerce rationale. Id. at 1629-30. Cases since Lo-
pez, however, confirm that the instrumentalities and channels of commerce rationales re-
main viable. See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588-90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 681 (1995) (applying the instrumentalities rationale to affirm the constitutionality of a
federal carjacking law).
Allowing for use of the instrumentalities and channels of commerce rationale permits
federal regulation of all other activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The majority's formulation does not foreclose completely the
federal government's ability to enact federal criminal laws; instead, courts will uphold fed-
eral criminal laws if the intrastate criminal activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. See Cohen & Fried, supra note 222, at 23 (listing several post-Lopez cases in
which courts have upheld federal criminal laws). But cf. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 603 (Becker, J.,
dissenting) ("I believe that non-commercial intrastate crimes, even ones receiving publicity
in the national media, are a matter of state and not federal concern.").
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substantial effect on interstate commerce. 262 Thus, the majority's holding
still permits considerable federal regulation under the commerce clause
and is not, as Justice Souter alleged, "a return to the untenable jurispru-
dence from which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago.",26 3 In-
stead, the majority's distinction between commercial and noncommercial
activities tempers original intentions with modem realities.
D. Unacceptable Flaws Inherent in a Limitless Commerce Power
Justice Souter's dissent disagreed with the majority's commercial/non-
commercial distinction and advocated a more permissive interpretation
of the federal commerce power."6 This liberal interpretation, however,
has several flaws. First, Justice Souter's interpretation of the commerce
power would permit Congress to regulate virtually any activity even if
only a remote possibility existed that the activity would affect interstate
commerce. 65 Indeed, Justice Souter argued that Congress should accept
any justification "within the realm of reason. '2 66 This approach ignores
the Court's role in maintaining the federal-state balance.267 Under Jus-
tice Souter's approach, the Court would be required to uphold a law with
a connection to interstate commerce that was "within the realm of rea-
son," regardless of whether it upset the federal balance.
Second, Justice Breyer's limitless interpretation of the commerce
power would render other enumerated federal powers in Article I, sec-
tion 8 meaningless.268 If the commerce clause were intended to encom-
pass every activity that "significantly affected ,269 commerce, most
activities would be subject to regulation because they somehow affect
262. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; see, e.g., United States v. Trupin, No. 95 Cr. 450, 1996
WL 50237 at 2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1996) (distinguishing Lopez and upholding a federal law
prohibiting possession of stolen goods because the statute contained a jurisdictional ele-
ment limiting the scope to possessing stolen goods that had moved in interstate com-
merce); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding a federal law
prohibiting a convicted felon to possess a firearm as a valid exercise of the commerce
power because the statute provided for a nexus between possession and interstate com-
merce); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 383
(1995) (affirming the conviction of a judge prosecuted under the Hobbs Act because the
Act required that the violation have a nexus with interstate commerce).
263. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1652-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
264. See id.
265. See id. at 1654.
266. Id. at 1656.
267. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's role in maintaining
the federal balance).
268. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1395 (discussing possible limits on Congress given the
enumerated powers and limitations contained in Article 1).
269. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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commerce.2 7 ° Extending Justice Breyer's argument to its logical conclu-
sion would render other enumerated powers in Article I, section 8 unnec-
essary because activities such as bankruptcy,271 patents and copyrights, 272
and immigration 273 certainly could be classified under the commerce
heading.
Finally, both Justice Breyer's and Justice Souter's dissents ignored the
states' important function of serving as laboratories for experimenta-
tion.274 States traditionally have structured criminal laws within their re-
spective jurisdictions, experimenting with various solutions and gaining
expertise.275 Addressing the problem of prohibiting guns in schools im-
plicates unique circumstances within each state, and several states, includ-
ing Texas, have enacted laws prohibiting guns in school zones.2 76 The
270. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The section provides in part: "To establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id. See generally
JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 47-56
(1994) (assessing the constitutional history the bankruptcy clause).
272. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. The relevant part provides: "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. See generally STORY, supra
note 271, at 83-85 (discussing the origin of the writing and discoveries clause).
273. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The section provides in part: "To establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization .... " Id. See generally STORY, supra note 271, at 45-46 (reviewing the
exclusive power of the federal government to establish uniform rules of naturalization).
274. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."); see also Rachel J. Littman, Comment, Gun-Free Schools:
Constitutional Powers, Limitations, and Social Policy: Concerns Surrounding Federal Regu-
lation of Firearms in School 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 723 (1995). Some observers pro-
pose that local laws, specifically local gun control laws, are more effective because they
address local concerns. Id. The Morton Grove ordinance, a community based gun control
law, and Goals 2000, a federal funding act with voluntary compliance, are better ap-
proaches to the problem of guns in schools. See id. at 159-72 (discussing the effectiveness
of the Morton Grove ordinance and the Goals 2000 program).
275. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641. Similarly, the states have gained expertise in areas such
as tort law. Eleanor N. Bradley, State Reform of Tort Laws Proceeds During Calls for
Federal Intervention, Corp. Couns. Daily (BNA), at D-17 (May 23, 1995). Despite years of
the state legislatures, state courts, and voters "fashioning and refashioning" state tort law
the federal government may enact legislation that would pre-empt those state laws. Id.
Some commentators note that this type of federal intervention is an "effrontery to the
states" that undermines state expertise that has developed in this area over the past 20
years. Id.
276. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.195(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1995) (felony); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(A)(12) (Supp. 1995) (misdemeanor or felony); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-73-119 (a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(A) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1993) (felony); CAL. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 626.9(b) (Deering Supp. 1996) (felony or misdemeanor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
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state, not the federal government, can combat this problem most appro-
priately. 2" Federal intervention such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act
may preempt effective local solutions that states have developed based on
their expertise.278
12-105.5(1) (Supp. 1995) (misdemeanor); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217b (West 1994
& Supp. 1995) (felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.115(1), 810.095(1) (West Supp. 1996) (fel-
ony); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(b) (Supp. 1995) (felony); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-
3302C(1), 18-3302D(1) (Supp 1995) (misdemeanor); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/24-1
(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (felony); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-9-2 (Burns Supp. 1995)
(felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4204(a)(4) (Supp. 1993) (misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:95.2(A), (West Supp. 1996) (no more than 5 years of hard labor); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6552(1) (West 1993) (Class E crime); MD. CODE ANN. OF 1957, art.
27, § 36A(a) (1992) (misdemeanor or felony); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10(j)
(West 1990) (misdemeanor); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.273a(1) (West Supp. 1995)
(misdemeanor or felony); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.66 subd. 1(a)(1), 1(b)(1) (West Supp.
1996) (misdemeanor or felony); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-37-17(2) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (fel-
ony); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(1)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (misdemeanor); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-8-334 (1995) (felony if purpose to commit a felony); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202.265 (Michie Supp. 1995) (gross misdemeanor); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5e(1) (West
1995) (misdemeanor); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2.1. (Michie Supp. 1994) (felony); N.Y. PE-
NAL LAW § 265.01(3) (McKinney 1989) (misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2.(b)
(1995 & Supp. 1995) (felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05(1) (1995) (misdemeanor);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.122 (Anderson Supp. 1995) (felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1280.1 (West Supp. 1996) (felony); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.370(1) (1995) (felony); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 912(b) (1983) (misdemeanor); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-60(a)
(Supp. 1995) (felony); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-420(A), § 16-23-430(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1995) (felony); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 13-32-7 (Supp. 1995) (misdemeanor); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1309(b)(1), (c)(1) (1991) (misdemeanor or felony); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996) (felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5 (1995)
(misdemeanor); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4004 (Supp. 1995) (felony); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-308.1 (Michie Supp. 1995) (misdemeanor or felony); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.41.280 (1) (West Supp. 1996) (gross misdemeanor); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-lla(b)(1)
(Supp. 1995) (felony).
277. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to "provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States."). If the federal government decided
that federal regulation was necessary, the government could invoke the spending power to
regulate on a national scale; the spending power enables Congress to condition the receipt
of federal funds on the adoption of certain federally mandated measures. New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206-12 (1987) (noting that the spending clause is independent of and potentially broader
than the commerce clause). See generally Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Condi-
tional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 117-25 (examining the
expansive holding in Dole); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987) (examining the limits on the federal spending
power).
Much federal aid is presently conditioned on amendments of state criminal laws. See
Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C. § 159 (1994) (reducing each state's federal highway funds
by 10% unless it enacts laws revoking driving privileges of convicted drug offenders for six
months).
278. See The Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994); Civil
Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West 1995).
Both of these statutes are examples of other federal statutes that encroach upon the state's
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the past sixty years, the Supreme Court has approved Congress's
expansive use of the commerce clause, while always articulating limits on
this power. At first blush, Lopez seems to deviate from established com-
merce clause jurisprudence. The Gun-Free School Zones Act, however,
is merely an example of a federal statute that went beyond those limits.
The majority's decision is consistent with the Court's established position
that it will not sustain statutes significantly altering the federal-state bal-
ance unless Congress clearly articulates its invocation of the commerce
power. Lopez also reaffirms the Court's continued reluctance to grant
the federal government a general police power. By distinguishing be-
tween commercial and noncommercial activities, the majority permits the
federal government to regulate on a national scale while simultaneously
safeguarding the states' ability to exercise their inherent police powers
that the Constitution reserves. Essentially, Lopez clarifies the limits of
the commerce power and ensures the continuation of the federal system
of government.
Rachel Elizabeth Smith
power to regulate its own internal affairs regarding gun control and violence against wo-
men. See also Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (involving
a federal carjacking statute).
Some members of Congress have even considered proposing a bill entitled "The Feder-
alism Act of 1995" which would impose notice requirements on Congress before enacting a
law that preempted state law. Brown Will Introduce Bill to Limit Congress' Ability to Pre-
empt State Laws DAILY REP. FOR EXECS. (BNA) No., 133, at A-6 (July 12, 1995). When
Congress enacts an ambiguous statute, this bill would encourage the courts to find in favor
of the states. Id.
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